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INFLATION 
Inflation as a topic for this seventh in a series of UMC-Perry Foundation seminars 
differs from the others in that it is not exclusively agricultural. As explained in 
the opening paper, it stands as the foremost policy issue bearing on agriculture as of 
1979, even if agriculture can lay no special claim to it. 
Attendance and participation at the seminar confirmed that inflation is seen as 
both important and relevant to agriculture. 
If a single theme permeated the day and a half of discussion it was that inflation 
is complex, many-pronged. No one at the seminar offered single explanations or proposed 
simple cures. This viewpoint may appear as frustrating, but the consensus was that it 
is the correct one. 
UMC-Perry Foundation seminars are held under terms of an agreement between the 
Perry Foundation and the University of Missouri. The object of the seminars is "to 
promote the development of information relative to the socio-economic forces that bear 
on the welfare of family operated farms and ranches, and upon the income to those 
operators; to disseminate that information widely among agricultural leaders of the 
nation; and to provide a forum ... for discussion ... by leaders of organizations, 
institutions, and legislators. 1I 
The Perry Foundation was established in Robstown, Texas in 1946 as a memorial to 
members of the Perry family who did much for the agriculture of South Texas. It both 
sponsors and carries on research in agriculture. The Foundation is dedicated to working 
toward a prosperous agriculture and the welfare of the people on the land. 
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WHAT INFLATION IS AND DOES 
Harold F. Breimyer 
Perry Foundation Professor of Agricultural 
Economics and Extension Economist 
inflation is a symptom of the failure of an economy 
to deliver the income that workers, businesses, and govern-
ments require, and of conflicts within and between all these 
groups over distr ibution of the income that is available. II 
-- Joan Robinson and Francis Cripps* 
In this seminar we aspire to pass judgment on the U. S. economy. We address our 
attention to how well it is working -- or, perhaps better stated, not working. We will 
try to understand the reasons for disappointing performance, and may even hazard some 
guesses as to what courses of corrective action offer promise. 
As these annual seminars are dedicated to agriculture we give priority to its eco-
nomic position. Yet the state of the economy may be serious enough to call for farmers, 
and every other interest group, to subordinate individual loyalties to common concerns. 
I suggest respectfully that such is the case. We are here not as individuals trying to 
dodge or even profit from economic doldrums but as citizens hoping to correct them. 
The specific topic is inflation. Strictly defined, inflation is a pronounced tend-
ency for prices of goods and services to rise. It is that and nothing more. It is 
simply an observed pattern. 
Because it is only a description of events, inflation as a term contains no explan-
ation of why it exists. Raw data on price trends tell us nothing about why they take 
place. For answers we must look further, much further. Moreover, even though prices in 
general may be rising, we cannot explain each individual price movement in that way. To 
do that we have to look at individual commodity situations. Agriculture is a case in 
point. For example, sharp increases in the price of beef a year or two ago were often 
attributed to inflation, in disregard of the swing of the cattle cycle from liquidation 
toward rebuilding. By the inflationary line of argument I donlt know how the 1979 weak-
ness in price of pork may be accounted for! 
Inflation in a Sputtering Economy: Stagflation 
If inflation is technically only a general price uptrend, question arises as to why 
this seminar is converted into an examination of the total economy. 
Answers are two. The first is that inflation, though important of itself, is also 
an indicator of trouble in the economy. I once wrote that it is both the thermometer 
and the fever. The second reason for interpreting inflation so broadly is that the 
public does so. U. S. citizens look on inflation in terms of everything bad that is 
happening in the economy, and to themselves. They associate with inflation every price 
increase, unemployment, the energy dilemma (itls not a crisis -- that comes next), and 
just about all the bad news that fills the business pages of the Sunday newspaper. They 
add their private income-expense frustration. young farmers fret about out-of-sight land 
prices and new peaks in cost of borrowed money. And so on. Itls a bumper crop of com-
plaints. 
A word has been coined to apply to the present state of economic affairs. It is 
stagflation. The word is clumsy but appropriate. It is what we are talking about a 
stagnating but inflationary economy. 
Unfortunately, there is more professed than actual wisdom about what is happening. 
The columnist James Reston observed recently that the U. S. has too many self-appointed 
Secretaries of State. l . I sometimes wonder if we have too many self-appointed Secretaries 
of the Treasury and Chairmen of the Federal Reserve Board. Nor do I exempt economists 
from this re·buke. On the contrary, I agree with critics who say academic economists are 
experiencing their worst credibility crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 2 
* "Keynes today," in Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Fall 1979, p. 142. 
1 
2 
Columbia Missourian, Sept. 26, 1979, p. 4A. 
For example, former Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal has said, "I really think 
the economics profession is close to bankruptcy in understanding the present situ-
ation." Quoted by Clarence C. Walton, "Divergent Views of Inflation," in Inflation 
and National Survival, Academy of Political Science, 1979, p. 3. 
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Economists have won few laurels in either interpreting or correcting our present prob-
lems. Older economists were trained in depression; younger ones are schooled in the 
happy experience of post-war expansion. Neither group is prepared for stagflation. 
The Historic Price-level Record 
First, the historical record of price trends. 
INDEX OF PRODUCER (WHOLESALE) PRICES 
1967 = 100 
The chart shows the record of wholesale commodity ("producer") prices in the United 
States since 1800. Familiar to everyone is the inflationary bubbles during wars --
War of 1812, Civil War, and World War I. One might suppose that we zoomed to another 
peak in World War II, only to fail to deflate afterward. Not so. In spite of what anti-
price-control revisionists tell us, controls in World War II effectively choked off 
serious inflation. In the process a postwar deflation similar to that of 1920-21, which 
hurt farmers so badly, was avoided. 
Instead, after World War II we got a delayed inflation. It might have spent itself 
except for the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950. Then it was that the wholesale 
price index reached the 100 mark, which was held steadily until the late 1960s. 
At the 1979 national extension policy conference, Dennis Star leaf of Iowa State 
University observed that those 15 years were the longest period of stable prices in our 
nation's history. Agriculture, however, can find irony in that record. Midway in those 
15 years I was staff economist for the Council of Economic Advisers, and the only one 
with ~n agricultural background. My economist friends boasted about how successfully 
our policies were attaining price stability. I taunted in reply that agriculture was 
doing it. It was the Atlas holding up the stability world. Steadily declining prices 
in the farming sector were offsetting steadily rising prices in the industrial sector. 
The wholesale price index for finished goods rose from 86 in 1951 to 100 in 1967, but 
the index for farm products dropped from 124 in 1951 to a low of 95 in 1964, before it 
edged up to 100 in 1967. In fairness I add that prices of other raw materials except 
fuel were essentially stable during those 15 years. 
The picture has changed since. During the 1970s, significantly, all categories of 
prices have joined in a pronounced uptrend. Fuel has been in the lead but other raw 
materials and farm products too have been conspicuous. Price indexes for September 1979, 
on a 1967 base as 100, tell the story. 
Producer (wholesale) price index, 
U. S., September 1979 (1967=100) 
All finished goods 220 
Consumer foods 228 
Finished goods excluding 
consumer foods 216 
Intermediate materials 251 
Crude materials 288 
Foodstuffs and feedstuffs 249 
Crude Fuel 599 
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Farm and, food ~r~ducts,have not led the inflationary pack but neither have they 
played a herolc antl-lnflatlonary role as they did in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
To illustrate my second point of how inflation dominates rising dollar incomes, 
average weekly earnings in private nonagricultural employment increased from $120 in 
1970 to $203 in 1978, a 69 percent gain. The cost of living rose from an index of 
116 to 195, a 68 percent advance. The net purchasing power gain over 10 years was a 
trivial one percent. 
The unevenness of inflation ' s effects is well known, I believe. Persons on fixed 
or slowly rising incomes, including many retirees, are hurt worst of all. Debtors gain 
at the expense of creditors. Saving is unattractive; a dollar saved is not a dollar 
earned but one eroded by inflation. Established holders of fixed tangible assets do 
well; those lacking them are disadvantaged. 
Inflation is in some respects a transfer of wealth between generations -- not in 
the direction we usually regard as good, from the older to the younger, but to the older 
at the expense of the younger. This explains why individuals of the older generation 
are so eager to protect their younger generation, that is, their children. The more 
successfully they do so, the more are other young people burdened. Unchecked inflation 
magnifies hereditary patterns of wealth possession. 
The Dismal Productivity Record 
In the last two annual reports of the Council of Economic Advisers, published with 
the Economic Report of the President, the Council noted the steadily worsening produc-
tivity record of the U. S. economy. The Council's gross output/input indexes show al-
most no gains in recent years. 
At our national extension conference some persons insisted that the indexes mis-
lead. They are based in part on quantitative consumption items that have counted 
heavily in the past, such as big automobiles, and give no credit to qualitative improve-
ments such as reduced pollution of air and water or control of communicable disease. 
The critics have a point. We ought not lash ourselves too severely. But even so, 
productivity has lagged below earlier performance. 
I will not recite all the issues in dispute. To what extent are we hurt by stead-
ily tightening supply of natural resources? Are we less industrious than before? 
But I want to put the matter differently. The big change, I believe, is in our 
outlook. We once took steadily rising productivity for granted, as though it were our 
birthright. We cannot do that now, and we are worried. 
And because we were confident about productivity, we centered our concern on de-
mand. Ever since the Great Depression of the 1930s economic policy has been directed 
toward putting enough purchasing power in the hands of consumers to sustain production. 
This line of reasoning endorsed both private and public spending. It became fashionable 
and almost patriotic to spend money and thereby keep the wheels of industry turning --
and demand for farm products high! 
We have changed our thinking. It's not that we have a replacement doctrine, but 
rather that we are confused. We are fearful that any spending now translates not into 
more production but inflation. On these grounds a balanced governmental budget is 
supported, and interest rates are pushed skyward. Yet at the same time, as a marvelous 
example of inconsistency, we hear it said that if the present recession worsens income 
taxes should be reduced so as to give consumers more money to spend! 
The Monetary Issue 
Just to mention interest rates reminds that a small but devout band of economists 
explains our economic troubles solely in terms of monetary policy. Professor Friedman 
is the leading spokesman. 
It's the kind of credo that divides people into the true believers and non-believers. 
Most of us are in the latter category. 
To be sure, inflation involves the use of more money. It therefore seems logical 
that if the money supply were restricted enough, inflation could not take place. 
In rebuttal are three facts. One, even if monetary authorities were to keep a 
tight lid on M
l
, M
2
, and any other official money, human beings are clever enough to de-
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vise sUbstitute money, notably credit. Land contracts are an example. Two, monetary 
authorities are obliged by law to meet the legitimate needs of business for money. The 
whole purpose of the Federal Reserve system is to make sure business is not stifled by a 
squeeze in operating funds. The Fed cannot always, simultaneously, keep business liquid 
and an economy uninflated. 
My third comment is an application of the second: by no stretch of the imagination 
could monetary authorities have prevented inflation the last seven years in the face of 
OPEC's IO-fold increase in oil prices. It is ludicrous even to consider the possibility. 
The Lagging Investment Issue 
Closely related to money and banking and another example of inconsistency in public 
attitudes is the complaint. heard often, especially in the business press, that the econ-
omy is in the doldrums because investors are not investing enough. 
After all, the argument goes, didn't we get our productivity by building a big 
capital plant? 
The inconsistency is seen clearly when slow investment is publicly regretted yet 
interest rates are propelled higher in order to discourage new borrowing, much of which 
goes into investment. To add to the confusion, we can suspect that under-investment is 
sometimes stressed so much in order to justify further tax breaks for investors. The 
private interest can be camouflaged in public-interest clothes. 
I suggest that the whole area is murky. I offer only a few observations, themselves 
partly contradictory. 
First, it is true that inflation discourages saving. Inflation induces people to 
put their money into tangible goods rather than saving. This is one of the injurious 
effects of inflation. 
A second point is that a maturing economy does not require as much new investment 
as a more youthful, fast-growing one does. Perhaps the slowed investment is not so dam-
aging. The greater problem may be that full use is not being made of the capital plant 
we already have. 
Thirdly, I offer an incisive and damaging criticism about the whole investment 
issue. It is that so much of the so-called investment being made during inflation is 
not venture capital going into new enterprises. Instead, it is only buying and selling 
of existing assets. These may be industrial plant, whole businesses, or in agriculture, 
farmland. Transfer of existing assets adds nothing to gross output of the economy. Ram-
pant selling and buying of plant-in-place, in anticipation of further appreciation of 
value, may be the biggest single factor now fueling inflation. 
It follows that if we want to design an investment policy for inflation control, 
incentives must be confined to new rather than replacement investment. Investment for 
ownership transfer at inflated prices would be sharply discouraged. Capital gains tax 
concessions on this latter investment would be wholly withdrawn. 
Natural Resources and Inflation 
To what extent is the natural resource base for our economy being eroded away? This 
is a grim question. We have been a nation proud of our bountiful resources of soil, 
forest, metals, petroleum, natural gas. We are running short, and our growing reliance 
on imports is well publicized. 
Manifestly, the changing petroleum situation has been magnified by the pricing 
policy of OPEC -- and by our unwillingness to respond by cutting back materially on our 
consumption. Moreover, our oil buying leads to a foreign exchange deficit, weakening 
the dollar and exacerbating inflation. 
The topic is too big for analysis in depth in this paper. It belongs in a listing 
of the difficult aspects of our inflation. My own position is one of concern if not 
foreboding. At the same time, I concur with critics who say we could live well without 
being so wasteful of resources if we would only change our habits and life styles. I 
would be more optimistic if we could do even the simple things, such as salvaging (re-
cycling) beer and soft drink cans. 
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Competitiveness of the Economy 
Another aspect of inflation, or stagflation, that deserves more attention than I 
can give here is ~he competitive make-up of the economy. On this too opinion divides. 
Spoke~men for bUSlness of~en tell us that ours is an Adam Smith Lilliputian economy --
all 11ttle people scrambllng around. Professor Galbraith is the best known critic who 
says half the economy is of big units that plan and operate in the manner of the U. S. 
Army. 
This issue is a genuine one; and our economy is certainly mixed in its competitive 
composition. 
Especially relevant to our topic is the variable capacity of units in the economy 
to defend themselves against inflation. Best protected are businesses with pricing 
power; the stronger labor unions; and civil service, military, and Social Security re-
tirees who can induce the government to index their retirement benefits. Many other 
parts of the economy are defenseless and vulnerable. 
A whole new school of economists alleges that business and labor now playa rising 
wage-price-wage game that both protects the participants and assures continued inflation. 
Paradoxically, a national policy to keep the economy going frees the players to continue 
their game. Lester Thurow puts it well: 
Economic power and the capacity to raise prices and wages faster than 
would occur in a competitive economy are buttressed by modern fiscal and 
monetary economics. All of the large players in the economic game know 
that the government is not going to let the economy collapse no matter how 
much they raise their own wages or prices. Thus ... the discipline of 
the market is not present or very much attenuated. 3 
Inflation and Agriculture 
Inflation's effects on agriculture differ in the short and long run. Moreover, in-
flation bears unevenly on the various parts of agriculture, virtually redistributing 
wealth and income and also inviting nonfarmers' participation. 
Most farm products are priced in spot markets and therefore are volatile. As a 
rule, at the beginning of an inflationary spurt, especially one arising in strong demand, 
prices of farm products take off heavenward. When inflation subsides, farm product 
prices slacken or sink. Meantime, prices of industrial items farmers buy are slow to 
start upward but equally slow to level off -- and seldom turn downward. Therefore the 
second stage puts farmers in a price-cost squeeze. 
It seems to me this succession was followed from 1973 to 1977. First farm product 
prices rose, then prices of industrial goods farmers buy. In the last year or so prices 
of farm commodities have moved higher again, although not as fast as before. By analogy, 
a new price-cost squeeze may be in the offing. 
Even more significant is how inflation affects asset values in agriculture. The 
price of land climbs incessantly, it would seem, yielding big windfall bonuses for es-
tablished farmers and virtually denying underfunded younger farmers an opportunity to 
enter farming. Moreover, so long as landholding proves the best participant in infla-
tion (not a "hedge against inflation") it will be so attractive that investors will rush 
in from everywhere, even from Germany and Japan. An eventual outcome is to pry land-
holding out of the hands of the operators. 
As I have written extensively on this subject, I drop it here except to add that 
the land boom will end sometime. When it does the weeping and gnashing of teeth will be 
heard from Augusta to San Diego, or maybe even from Frankfurt to Tokyo. 
Inflation and the National Psyche 
Daniel Yankelovich, astute observer of the U. S. scene, insists that inflation now 
grips the public as " no other issue has •.• since World War II," but that it is now 
3 Lester C. Thurow, liThe U. S. Economic System -- What is it Becoming?" paper given 
at National Public Policy Conference (Extension), Sept. 1975, (mimeo), p. 9. 
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much more than economic. It would be a mistake, he believes, lito address the problem 
of inflation in economic terms." 4 
Inflation may have become psychic trauma. If so, the problem of dealing with it is 
magnified. It's partly a matter ~hat.those who prof~t ~rom inflation will resist control 
with every lobbying dollar at the~r d7s~osal .. The ~~ct~ms, on the other hand, may re-
gress through discouragement into pol~t~cal al~enat~on. If enough do so the democratic 
process is jeopardized and could become a casualty. I do not want to overdraw; we are 
not at that stage yet. But students of history shout their warnings. 
The Futility of Cure by Depression 
If one wanted to be an alarmist he could find reason enough in the clumsy, half-
hearted, uncertain steps we have taken thus far. O~e should P7rhaps be slow to object, 
inasmuch as both consensus and commitment are notor~ously lack~ng. That is, we as a 
people are not sure what the best policy is, and are not willing to join wholeOheartedly 
in any policy action. 
Nonetheless, I put myself on record as being highly skeptical about the induced-de-
pression tactic. As one reason, I am a veteran of ~he ~930s.depression and can testify 
to how vicious and dangerous it was. Also, the pol~cy ~s su~ted to an overheated econ-
omy, but ours is not that. It is stagnant. Only a nation intellectually destitute re-
lies heavily on forced unemployment. I w~s interested to read Congr~ssman Reuss's ob-
servation that "for the first time, Fed ii.e., Federal Reserve BoarQ/ members are wonder-
ing out loud whether it really makes sense to throw men and women out of work and busi-
nesses into bankruptcy in order to 'rescue the dollar' ."5 
Summary and Final Comments 
In brief summary, our present inflation, or stagflation, is not a random event ex-
plained in simple terms of mismanaged tax rates, interest rates, government financing, 
or money supply. It has not been induced by rampant government spending; nor have 
business firms and labor unions ganged up to fleece us unorganized souls out of our 
birthright. None of these scapegoats of itself accounts for our economic debility. Com-
bined, of course, they can be impressive. 
I may have touched too lightly on the unevenness of inflation's effects. I perhaps 
should have emphasized more the second part of the quotation from Robinson and Cripps. 
Stagnation in the economy sharpens sensitivity to inequality in who takes inflation's 
beating. Civil unrest is a threatened outcome. 
I have chosen instead to put top emphasis on inflation's meaning to asset values, 
and really more than that to all our financial commitments to payoff in the future. 
The escalation in land values, for example, is attributable less to land's yield of crops 
than to inflationary gains. Many people want to buy land in order to capture further 
increases in prices. Make no mistake; it's the old chain letter game. Like that game, 
there is no social benefit, only a transfer of wealth to winners from losers. 
But all capital values -- valuation of fixed assets, aggregate value of stock shares, 
and even the principal sum of debts -- have in common that they represent promises to 
deliver dollar for dollar at some future date. We have promised more than can possibly 
be delivered, in my judgment. The recourse taken to date is to deliver the dollars but 
default on their worth. But how long can we continue to transfer a burden of unfulfillable 
obligation to our next generation? Unless we show remarkable ingenuity in regaining 
economic equilibrium there are only three alternate courses: further self-spiraling 
inflation, severe depression, or imposed price and wage controls. 
I close on the theme that the Western World is entering a new historic era, an era 
when the wherewithal for resplendent material prosperity is becoming scarcer. This is 
not a .doomsday theme but one calling for sober reckoning. If I am correct, our nation 
will not resolve its problem of inflation until our citizens reconcile themselves to 
finding more of their satisfactions in the realm of the spir it than of luxury-level 
creature comforts. The latter will become scarcer, and denying their scarcity by the 
ruse of inflation is futile. 
4 
5 
Daniel Yankelovich, liThe Noneconomic Side of Inflation," in Inflation and National 
Survival, Academy of Political Science, 1979, p. 21. 
Henry S. Reuss, quoted in Newsweek, Oct. 1, 1979, p. 52. 
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IN A LIFEBOAT WITH AN ELEPHANT 
John M. Kuhlman 
Middlebush Professor of Economics 
Introduction 
I have never been in a lifeboat with an elephant; furthermore, I never want to be 
in a lifeboat with an elephant. In my imagination, though, I can see the elephant try-
ing to make himself comfortable. As he moves forward, the aft portion of the boat 
rises out of the water. As he moves from side to side, I scramble to keep from falling 
out of the boat. In short, a lifeboat with one very large passenger and one very small 
passenger has to be an unstable platform. It has to be more unstable than a lifeboat 
with the same total amount of weight distributed equally over a large number of 
passengers. 
My "ideal society" also consists of a large number of small units rather than a 
small number of extremely large units. Just as I don't know whether I could co-exist 
with an elephant in a lifeboat, neither am I sure that I can co-exist with a small 
number of very large units in the social system. 
Let me first pose the problems I see in the form of a series of questions. I pose 
them without any promise of answering them. Can the small but equally efficient inde-
pendent newspapers and television stations co-exist alongside the giant chains and net-
work-owned stations? Can a system of small and independent farmers co-exist with large 
corporate farms and integrated agri-business firms? Can we have a system in which small 
firms go broke on the basis that that is how the system works, and then the large firms 
are bailed out? Can a system function in which the large number of workers exist by 
the seat of their brows and a relatively small number of organized workers live by the 
force of their bargaining power? How much of the problem of declining productivity 
is associated with the structure of the system? Is "alienation" and the changing moral 
code in any way associated with the structure of the system? And finally, do all of 
these (and other) problems have any causal relationship to inflation? 
I shall argue, of course, that they do influence inflation. But I admit that I I 
start from intuition. Many of my brethren in the field of economics have been "born 
again" and now see the light -- the cause of our dilenuna is to be found in the mis-
management of our money supply. But more and more economists are saying that we should 
turn our attention to the structure of the system. And I believe, or at least I hope, 
that more and more economists are concerned about the narrowness of the discipline and 
its lack of insight into the big and important problems of the day. 
So let me begin. 
A Broad Overview of the Economy 
The economic system of the United States is a collection of different types of 
markets, ranging from the very competitive to those which are highly monopolistic in 
nature. In agriculture, most of the markets are quite competitive. By this I mean that 
the suppliers have no influence on price, in contrast with some obvious instances in 
which the buyers exercise control over the price. Agriculture is an industry of many 
small firms without market power. In many respects the nation's retail industry is 
similar to agriculture, but within the past four decades we have seen the development 
of large retailers such as Sears and J. C. Penney, plus RCA which controls Hertz, Mobil 
Oil which owns Montgomery Ward, etc. The service industries are, for the most part, 
made up of many small firms but even here, some industries such as accounting and bank-
ing are dominated by a few very large firms. 
In manufacturing, the picture is considerably different. In automobiles, there 
are two large domestic manufacturers and two small (and marginal) firms. Competition 
in the automobile industry is largely from foreign producers. In farm machinery, a 
small number of firms dominate the manufacture of heavy agricultural equipment --
tractors and combines. In basic metals, a few firms dominate. There are three manu-
facturers of commercial aircraft; three of typewriters (including Exxon); two of tele-
phones (although the number may now be increasing); and so on. 
Using output, sales, employment, or nearly any other measure that one may choose 
except numbers, large economic units dominate a major portion of our economic life. 
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This has had a major impact on our educational system. Colleges of Business train 
future bureaucrats rather than future entrepreneurs. Colleges of Agriculture tilt to-
ward agri-business and away from the family farm. More and more of our undergraduates 
aspire to a nice bureaucratic position with a large firm or the government. And it may 
be that many of our college-educated entrepreneurs are those students who majored in 
some subject that did not enable them to get a job with General Dynamics, General 
Electric, General Foods, General Mills, General Motors, or the General Services Ad-
ministration. 
Who Owns What? Who Controls What? 
It is possible, in the case of local businesses or farms, to determine just who 
owns a particular piece of property or business. You know whom you are dealing with 
or whom you are working for. This is not true in the case of large economic units. 
Since Berle and Means wrote their masterpiece of many years ago, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, there has been a continuing dispute about who controls the modern 
corporation and in whose interest it functions. 
In 1973 the Committee on Government Operations undertook a study of corporate 
ownership. The relationships it found between corporations and the banking system are 
impressive. Some people tell me that there is nothing wrong with Chase-Manhattan's 
being the largest (or one of the largest) stockholders in four different airlines. 
These securities are, it is true, in trust accounts and the banks are supposed to vote 
them in the interest of the trustees. As a practical matter, most are voted for the 
incumbent management. 
But this is only one bit of evidence. The interlocking directorates between the 
nation's major banks and the manufacturing concerns would bring out the same picture. 
Or one might examine the use of wholly-owned subsidiaries in petroleum and the grain 
trade. Or one might choose to examine the use of corporate acronyms rather than in-
telligible names and the use of brand names in advertising without reference to the 
corporate name. 
All of these serve to lIfuzz over ll the question of ownership and control. Whom are 
you doing business with when you use your VISA card? Who is your employer when you 
work for Shell Oil or Hertz? Who is responsible if your car bursts into flames when 
hit in the rear? Who is minding the store? 
The Amoral Society 
Our traditional ethical teachings all involve person-to-person relationships. Do 
unto others as you would have them do unto you. Do not covet your neighbor's property. 
These and many more tell us how to behave toward some other person. But we have no 
ethical teachings as to how we should behave toward the large social unit and, in 
particular, the large corporations that I so sketchily describe. 
, 
We can't convert the above into rules for our conduct vis-a-vis the large corpora-
tions. Should we behave toward the Ford Motor Company as we expect them to behave to-
ward us? Are we under the same ethical obligation to tell American Express the truth 
as our next-door neighbor? 
Most of us would call it to the attention of a waitress if she gave us too much 
change but never check to make sure that all of the VISA sales slips come back. I 
suspect that most of us make sure that those that do come back are legitimate, but if 
there are some that are lost, that would seem to be VISA's problem. We see a little 
old lady or a cute young child pushing a grocery cart -- miles away from the store --
and we grab our camera for a contest-winning photograph rather than calling the police. 
It must be theft, but theft from whom? 
It is my hypothesis that the hired man on the farm works harder than the employee 
in the large organization. The farmer knows who the employer is. He is the fellow 
whom he is working next to in the hayfield. But the employee of the large firm knows 
his supervisor and maybe one or two people above that level--but the company -- oh, it 
is located in New York, or Chicago, or Paris, or somewhere. The employee in the small 
enterprise can see the relationship between his productivity and the success or failure 
of the firm. In the large enterprise, that relationship is not discernable to even 
the most discerning. Can a society continue to exist in which there is a large group 
of amoral relationsips coexisting with a group of moral, interpersonal relationships? 
It looks to me as though there is a very strong chance that the amoral relationships 
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between the individual and the anonymous corporation will spillover into the inter-
personal relationships. The way I treat Exxon may become the way I treat Joe Smith. 
If I don't have ethical obligations to the firm I work for, will my ethical obligations 
to other people also disappear? Unfortunately, I think that this is likely to happen, 
if it is not already happening. 
The Corporation as a Planning Agency 
Gailbraith and Heilbroner, among others, have commented that the United States has 
been moving, and continues to move, toward a system of planning and away from a market 
system. Large firms don't respond to the market as small firms do. Large firms orches-
trate their demand through advertising. They then use their resources in such a way as 
to meet the objectives they have created. 
When small firms make mistakes, few people outside the firm are hurt. When large 
firms make errors, short and long run consequences may extend far beyond the boundaries 
of the firm. There are many examples. General Motors, Firestone, and two oil companies 
financed National City Lines, a company which bought up street car systems in the 1930s. 
As a condition of the financing, National City Lines bought its buses from General Motors, 
its tires from Firestone, and its petroleum products from the oil companies. With our 
expert hindsight, we now recognize that it was probably unwise to move from a mass-
transit system to an automobile-oriented system. But it was a good business decision, 
just a bad planning decision. 
In the 1950s, the oil companies convinced the Eisenhower administration that quotas 
were needed on imported oil. The argument for a limitation of imports was simple: we 
should not be dependent upon foreign sources of oil. It was certainly in the short-run 
interest of the oil companies but may not have been in the long run interest of the 
country. 
As corporations increase in size and number, greater reliance is placed on internal 
financing as a source of funds for new capital expansion. We get the funds for financ-
ing expansion from the purchaser of the product rather than from the capital market. 
This is a part of the planning process. 
Large social organizations make large errors. They might be compared to the super-
tankers. They need lots of room to manuever. And when there is an accident, it will 
be a large accident. Small ships and small social institutions cannot have large 
accidents. And so it is with the corporations as planning agencies. They plan. They 
make large errors, but the cost of those errors will be the burden of society -- either 
directly through government bail-outs or indirectly through higher costs and less 
efficient utilization of resources. 
Corporations, Savings, and Productivity 
The common cry, and I am afraid it is widely accepted, is the present need for in-
creased saving which, in turn, is translated into increased investment in capital plant 
and equipment which, in turn, means increased productivity. In this scenario, believe 
it or not, the public turns out to be the culprit. We are consuming too much -- that is, 
we are using too much of the nation's resources to produce goods for consumption. We 
do not leave enough to produce capital goods. 
One might think that the obvious solution would be to reduce consumption. America's 
business community spends tens of billions of dollars a year encouraging people to con-
sume. Why don't the large corporations spend a fraction of their present advertising 
budget to encourage people to save--that is, not to consume--and then to purchase stock 
in those companies or buy their bonds? The problem with that approach is obvious. If 
people cut back on their consumption, sales and profits would fall, and unemployment 
in the corporate sector would increase. 
So let's cut the corporate income tax. The corporations will have a gIeater amount 
of after-tax income that can be used to finance capital expansion. It will be an in-
ternal decision rather than a market decision. But can we have capital expansion with-
out a reduction in consumption if there are few unemployed resources? The answer, to 
me at least, would appear to be rather dubious. Reducing corporate income taxes on the 
assumption that it will lead to increased investment and productivity will, in times 
of nearly full employment, only lead to further increases in prices. 
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Information 
In a competitive market such as agriculture, market information is pretty much a 
public good. Let me explain. A competitive market generates a series of transactions 
and associated with each there will be a price and quantity. A by-product is also 
generated. It is market information. Most of the parameters of the transaction are 
known to the public. Agricultural reporting services supplement the market data by 
issuing crop forecasts and figures on inventories. With some exceptions, all of the 
traders then have the same information. And that information is costless to them. Thus 
they can trade more or less as equals. 
I should say a word about the exceptions in 
companies dominate the world's trading in grain. 
that is not generally available in the market and 
ing. (This trading in grain is vividly described 
even these grain merchants encountered trouble in 
penchant for secrecy. 
agriculture. A handful of very large 
These firms do acquire information 
that gives them an advantage in trad-
in Morgan's Grain Merchants.) But 
trading with the Soviet union with its 
But what is an exception in agriculture may be much more common in that part of the 
economic system dominated by large firms. Take, for example, the large oil companies. 
From the time the oil is taken from the ground to the time it is put in your tank at the 
company-owned service station, there is no public price. We don't know what transfer 
prices the integrated companies put on the product. We can only hope they are using 
the market prices. 
It is difficult to formulate public policy in the field of petroleum since we have 
so little reliable information. As a matter of fact, we know little more than the 
companies choose to tell us. 
In general, 
internalized and 
dated accounting 
sources, outside 
profit on Tide. 
as companies get larger and larger more and more information is 
not generally available to the public. Large companies with consoli-
statements simply generate no market information that would cause re-
the company, to move. No one outside P&G, for example, can know the 
If we did, resources might move into the production of detergents. 
In the case of large companies, we are hardly in a position even to answer the basic 
question--IIAre they efficient?" There is no shortage of self-testimonials. Mr. Bork, 
in The Antitrust Paradox, happily assumes that they are efficienti otherwise they would 
not be so large. I would personally prefer, however, that the market work sufficiently 
well that the efficiency or lack of efficiency would be apparent to all. 
Although I fear that I am being too dismal and pessimistic, I can't see any change 
in the direction of improvement. More and more information will become private in-
formation. It is not at all apparent to me that we can get the proper kind of resource 
response in such a situation. 
Schools of Thought 
I make absolutely no claim that I was the first to think about the problems I have 
been covering. Many persons of great reputations and performances have addressed the 
problem. In general, their solutions can be put in three classes. 
Social Responsibility. This philosophy has often been voiced by this country's 
business leaders. Surely, the large corporations have tremendous amounts of economic 
power, but the individuals who exercise that power are wise and humanitarian and will 
not abuse that power. We simply do not need to worry. I don't believe for a minute 
that the holders and wielders of power are evil men. They are as honest as the rest. 
But still I don't trust a system that puts such large amounts ef power in the hands of 
so few. Their business should be promotion of efficiency, the management of innovation, 
the increase of profits. 
Galbraith. Many years ago John Kenneth Galbraith had a happy idea which he label-
ed IIcountervailing power." According to this theory, power begets power -- General 
Motors and a highly concentrated automobile industry will beget the United Auto Workers. 
I have never had any confidence in this theory since it is always possible, if not likely, 
that the two power groups will get together on the same side of the table. As Galbraith 
matured, he added variations. He would exempt all small business, whatever that might 
mean, from the antitrust laws on the grounds that they were too small to do much damage. 
And he would subject the large enterprises to direct controls. My response is that 
direct controls are impossible to administer in most situations. So Galbraith would 
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leave us no protection from the local antitrust violater and only a sham protection in 
the concentrated markets. 
Government Regulation and Assistance. As we move into a period where both more 
inflation and more unemployment are likely, we will probably find more individuals and 
businesses seeking a greater role for government. Consumers may demand price controls, 
wage guidelines, profit taxes, consumer subsidies (for heating oil, for example), and 
the like. Corporations and unions may seek direct aid for the distressed companies or 
industries as well as indirect assistance -- such as tariffs on imports and expanded 
government spending. The danger of this route is that it might result in a governmental 
system which resembles the corporate state of pre-World War II Italy. 
Competition as a Viable Public Policy 
Competition has both economic and noneconomic values. As far as the first is con-
cerned, it stimulates efficiency. If excess returns are being earned, resources will 
flow toward those higher returns, just as resources will move away from areas where re-
turns are too low. Competition promotes innovation. Insofar as noneconomic values are 
concerned, competition diffuses power over a large number of economic units rather than 
concentrating power in a small number of units. This is consistent with the political 
philosophy inherent in our Constitution and the federal form of government. 
But competition would be an impossible goal if there were widespread economies of 
scale in the economic system. If bigger farms are always more efficient tl1an smaller 
farms, the most efficient method of organization would be one large farm. No one be-
lieves this to be the case. There is, however, a rather warm disagreement about how 
large an automobile company needs to be in order to be efficient. Or a steel company, 
airline, railroad. 
As it stands, we don't really know how many firms in any given industry are needed, 
as judged by either efficiency or democratic pluralism as criteria. I offer these 
suggestions as tentative kinds of thoughts: 
First, in most industries I would prohibit horizontal mergers between all but the 
very smallest of firms. I wouldn't, for example, object if two small quarries or two 
local grocers merged but if two regional groups merged, I would object. 
Second, I would sharply limit vertical mergers -- that is, mergers where buyer and 
seller merge -- if either of the firms is greater than some minimum size. 
It is much preferable that firms grow though internal expansion rather than merger, 
since industry capacity increases with internal growth as contrasted with merely chang-
ing ownership. 
Third, I would simply prohibit growth through mergers for all large companies. I 
can't really believe that the consumer is better off because Mobil Oil purchased Mont-
gomery Ward or Exxon purchased Reliance Motor. Conglomerate firms such as ITT probably 
yield few benefits to the public that would not be equally likely under some other 
structure. 
Fourth, I would continue to prosecute with vigor such offenses as price fixing, 
predatory pricing, market sharing agreements, tying agreements, and other types of anti-
competitive practice. I think that it was a great step forward when the federal govern-
ment provided funds for the establishment of antitrust units in the offices of the 
attorneys general at the state level. Adding forty-some new antitrust enforcement 
agencies will do a great deal to discourage anticompetitive practices at the state and 
local level. 
Fifth, we should carefully examine our tax laws as to their effect on the structure 
of industry. Certainly, many of the mergers of the 1950s were a result of the tax code 
and it is likely that the present merger movement is similar. Two possibilities strike 
me as being worthwhile. One would be the use of a graduated corporate income tax so 
that larger firms would pay a higher tax rate than smaller firms. This would provide 
an incentive for firms to spin off divisions or subsidiaries instead of continually ex-
panding~ A second possibility would be to eliminate the corporate income tax and then 
tax all profits as though they ·were paid to the stockholders. This would result in 
profits being distributed as dividends and then the firms would have to go into capital 
markets to obtain the necessary capital. 
Sixth, we should carefully examine our tariff policy. At the turn of the century, 
the tariff was rightly called the "mother of trusts." The only chance for competition 
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in automobiles, steel, heavy farm equipment and the like is from foreign competitors. 
We should not yield to pressure to protect domestic industry from foreign competition. 
Deregulation 
In 1887, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Commission Act, a piece of legis-
lation which established a utility-type regulation for the railroads. Later legislation 
extended a similar type of regulation to pipe lines, airlines, electric utilities, tele-
phonic communications, and trucking. All were based on the assumption that the indus-
tries in question were natural monopolies; that is, the economies of scale were of such 
a magnitude that one firm was more efficient than two. Thus, these industries were 
regulated in terms of both price and the quality of service. 
But a natural monopoly is a product of the existing technology. In 1887, there was 
no substitute for railroad transportation for much of the country, and especially the 
Midwest. Now there is an abundance of substitutes. Competition is now a very real 
alternative. 
But competition, as we have seen over the past two years, will work in airlines. 
It will also work in trucking. It will probably work in the case of long distance lines 
in telephonic communications. We do not need regulation in the wholesale power in-
dustry. In short, much of our public utility regulation could be dismantled -- but only 
if we are willing to enforce a policy of competition. 
Conclusion 
It is very easy to say that the "other fellow" ought to compete. Competition is 
the accepted national policy -- for the other fellow. We want that policy enforced --
but always against the other fellow. There are always good reasons why competition 
should not prevail in medicine, farming, automobiles, insurance, trucking -- you name it. 
But immediate self-interest aside, competition does have virtues. First, it pro-
vides a tremendous stimulus for efficiency. Prices will tend to reflect costs. Second, 
it does have certain democratic values. In a competitive system, power is not concen-
trated. Young people have a greater chance to enter business as independent entre-
preneurs. And, finally, the competitive markets work in an impersonal manner without 
the benefit of any bureaucracy, public or private. 
At this stage the following question might fairly be asked. Would a policy of com-
petition solve the problem of inflation? I think that the answer would be that it is 
doubtful that it would. But an increased reliance upon competition would, at a very 
minimum, increase the chances that we would see some increase in productivity. It would 
increase the likelihood that prices would fall when demand falls. It would mean that 
there would be a greater incentive to weed out the inefficient producers. 
I don't believe that controlling the money supply or fine-tuning the system through 
taxes and spending will solve the problem of inflation if either of those policies is 
followed without any consideration of the structure of the economy_ If we move toward 
a more competitive economy, our traditional monetary and fiscal controls would at least 
have a chance of coping with inflation. 
16 
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF INFLATION 
Don Schilling 
Professor of Economics 
Back when I was in graduate school there was a great debate about flexible exchange 
rates as a viable alternative to the then extant Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange 
rates. A group which I shall refer to as "The Academic Scribblers" led by Milton Freid-
man and Egon Sohmen argued that flexible exchange rates would: 
A. free domestic policy from international constraints that otherwise would 
tend to lead to an underemployment equilibrium in the world economy; 
B. not cause inflation nor shrink trade. 
A second group I'll call "The Wor ldly Men of Affairs" lead by Henry Wallich and 
Robert Roosa argued that flexible exchange rates would: 
A. lead to world inflation by cutting the link between money and gold thereby 
relieving politicians of their last excuse for saying 'no' to requests for 
more spending; 
B. lead to greatly increased destabilizing speculation causing violent exchange 
rate movements and forcing world trade to shrivel. 
Both of these groups were half-right, which is above average for economists. 
Worldwide Inflation 
From data below (row 4) it is apparent that the acceleration of inflation that 
Americans have experienced during the last decade is a world-wide phenomenon. Actually 
the average rate of U. S. inflation since 1971 is more moderate that that of the rest 
of the developed world -- 6.9 percent against 10.4 percent per year. 
It is not clear, however, that introduction of the flexible exchange rate system 
in 1971 is the root cause of the inflation. If the comparison point were made in 1973 
instead of 1971, the results would be affected little. The evidence is also consistent 
with the hypothesis that OPEC is the root cause of the inflation. However, the shift 
to flexible rates did precede the oil crisis and certainly didn't cause it. Hence, 
(l)Money Supply 
(M2 appr ox. ) 
(2)Real Gross 
Domestic Product 
(3)Excess Money Supply 
Growth 
(1) - (2) 
(4) Inflation 
Rate (CPI) 
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(Real) 
ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH OF SOME SELECTED 
ECONOMIC TIME SERIES 
!Developed countries other 
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1948-71 1971-77 
10.4% 18% (78) 
5.3% 3.7% 
5.1% 14.3% 
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5.5% 9.4% 
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Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Un~ted K~ngdom. See next page for data 
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certainly the present day system of flexible rates has been permissive in the sense that 
there is no evidence to suggest that it has significantly slowed the course of inflation. 
Another hypothesis concerning the cause of inflation is illustrated in the table. 
Note that we have subtracted row (2) from row (1), that is, the annual rate of growth in 
real production from the annu~l rate of growth in M , to get a rough estimate of the 
annual rate of growth of money in excess of the nee~s of trade and production. As is seen 
in the data of row (3) for developed countries other than the United States the excess 
growth rate of money supply in 1971-77 was 280 percent of the rate in 1948-71. It 
surely is no coincidence that the inflation rate increased 248 percent. Comparable 
figures for the United States are 332 percent and 300 percent. We cannot conclusively 
convict monetary policy but certainly monetary control was not used to contain or hamper 
inflation either here or abroad. 
Implications of the Situation 
Given that we have flexible exchange rates and world-wide inflation, what are the 
implications of this situation? 
First we must read a balance of payments table from the bottom up. Balance of 
payments tables have traditionally been organized with the items involving the current 
flow of production and income at home and abroad at the top. Together these items com-
pose the current account and the "balance" on current account is a measure of our econ-
omy's performance in the international markets for goods and services. At the bottom of 
the traditional balance of payments lies the "cash" account, which presents the results 
of international trade in short-term financial claims which were viewed under fixed ex-
change rates as being in passive accommodation to the current account transactions. 
However, in a flexible rate system there is no assurance of week to week or month to 
month fixity of exchange rates. As a result, the large quantity of existing liquid, short-
term financial claims which move easily from one currency to another plays a crucial role 
in short run exchange rate movements. For example, U. S. trade (imports plus exports) is 
approximately 220 B$/year. But U. S. M3 is about 1,500 B$. Furthermore, the M3 of the 
other developed countries of the world 1S about 4,500 B$ at current exchange ra~es, and 
there are about 1,000 B$ in Euro-dollars outstanding. In any quarter, about one-fourth 
of the U. S. flow trade, 55 B$, will pass through the foreign exchange market. When 
this level of flow trade is compared to a stock of liquid assets that is 50 to 100 times 
as large, a modest shift in desired currency consumption of liquid asset holdings can be 
seen to overbalance the direction of flow trade during any period. For example, a 1 per-
cent movement of M3 assets into or out of the U. S. dollar amounts to an excess demand 
or supply of 45 B$, equal to two or three months gross flow trade. 
Obviously, then, in the short run the international value of the dollar is deter-
mined like gold or shares of corporate common stock, that is, by portfolio asset prefer-
ences. Costs of production, labor productivity, technology, and natural resources have 
no direct role. 
Determinants of Short Run Exchange Rates 
In the short run, exchange rates are largely determined by (1) short term interest 
rates, and (2) expectations of relative rates of inflation. Given that portfolio con-
siderations dominate the value of exchange rates the prime determinant of the currency 
composition of portfolios is the expected yield on each currency. The expected yield 
on each currency is in turn a function of the level of interest rates in that currency 
and the expected rate of change in that currency's exchange rate. Short run variation 
in exchange rate expectations is largely determined by "expectations of changes in in-
flation rates. " 
High inflation rates are more variable than low ones. As a result, holders of 
portfolios containing instruments denominated in several currencies have become very 
sensitive to anticipated changes in inflation rates, transmitting them to exchange rates. 
Hence, rates have become quite volatile in " the presence of double digit world inflation. 
Reference table preceding page: data used in computing these growth rates from Sept. 1979 
issue and 1973 Supplement to the I.M.F. International Financial Statistics; the 1963 and 
the 1977 issues of the U.N. Statistical Yearbook; the 1979 Economic Report of the Presi-
dent; C.I.A. Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1978. 
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The U. S. government and especially the Federal Reserve Board have no choice but 
to be sensitive to the international implications of their actions. Changes in monetary 
policy affect both future inflation rates and current interest rates. Hence the Fed is 
exposed to both the factors influencing exchange rates in the short run. It is no wonder, 
then, that the Fed now makes policy with one eye over its collective shoulder watching 
the foreign exchange markets. 
The international dimension is especially crucial in restraining too loose a monetary 
policy. As soon as international portfolio holders perceive an increase in the expected 
future U. S. inflation rate they will sell dollars, driving the dollar down, increasing 
the dollar price of both U. S. imports and exports, and thus shortening the lag between 
the policy change and inflation increase. I have little doubt that the Fed's tightening 
action of October 6 was very much influenced if not positively inspired by international 
pressures. Furthermore, the Fed does not dare let go of the U. S. money supply as long 
as double digit inflation is with us. Thus some degree of recession is already lIin the 
cards" for 1980. 
Implications for Agriculture 
When we step back and look at the changes in the U. S. exchange rate over the whole 
period since 1971, the picture does change markedly. After an initial decrease of about 
10 percent in its value, which was completed by the end of 1973, the dollar has remained 
remarkably stable, showing cyclical oscillations of 4 percent or so but absolutely no 
trend. Assuming that U. S. economic policies are neither much better nor much worse than 
those of the rest of the world, and given our large diversified economy, for the fore-
seeable future U. S. agriculture should be able to hold its international markets and 
perhaps expand them gradually. The reason is that U. S. agricultural exports are now 
mostly priced on world markets and therefore their selling prices possess a great deal 
of independence from the vagaries of our exchange rates. Also, we have a comparative 
advantage in many agricultural products at world prices. 
Fundamental Causes and Conclusions 
At a more fundamental level the world is in a transition phase toward a more energy 
scarce state. The result is lower worldwide growth rates in per capita incomes. The 
world's governments have jointly finessed difficult decisions about allocating the short-
falls in real incomes to their people by simply giving them all of the money that had 
been promised and letting them chase after the lessened supply of goods. The resulting 
allocation by inflation is effective but arbitrary. I can foresee no end to the in-
creasing real cost of energy for at least five or ten years and thus I expect a continu-
ation of rapid, variable and perhaps even further accelerating world inflation for at 
least as long. 
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FISCAL-MONETARY ASPECTS OF INFLATION 
Sheldon Stahl 
Economic Consultant 
Kansas City, Missouri 
My assigned topic of the fiscal and monetary aspects of inflation divides into the 
role of the Federal government's fiscal policy in either (a) generating inflation or 
(b) fighting inflation: and likewise the place of monetary policy in generating or 
fighting inflation. Monetary policy relates to the policies of the Federal Reserve 
system, the central bank of the united States. The question of to what extent the Fed-
eral Reserve by virtue of its monetary policy contributes to or restrains inflation was 
brought before us -- in a fine sense of timing from the standpoint of this seminar -- by 
its sharp increase in the discount rate on October 6. That was the Federal Reserve 
Board's version of a Saturday night massacre. The Board announced, on a Saturday of all 
days, and to the consternation of the financial community, that its discount rate, the 
rate it charges its member banks for borrowing, was being raised to an historic high of 
12 percent. In reality a little earlier the rate had become historic as it passed 9 per-
cent. On October 6 for some people it moved past historic to hysteric. 
The Federal Reserve Board also added a supplemental reserve requirement of about 
8 percent against what is genteelly referred to as managed liabilities or non-deposit 
liabilities, these principally being large certificates of deposit and other borrowings 
that need not be described here. But perhaps the most significant thing the Fed did, 
overlooked by merely casual clockers of Board actions, was to announce to a surprised 
financial community (and a gleeful St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank staff) that the oper-
ational procedures of the Federal Reserve were to be changed in dramatic fashion. No 
longer would the Fed operate by trying to control a specified group of key interest rates 
-- in particular the federal funds rate -- but rather would now direct attention pri~ 
marily to the provision of reserves to the banking system. Those reserves are the raw 
material out of which money and credit arise, and to suggest that this is really an his-
toric departure is a considerable understatement. In the month since October 6 the 
financial community has been turned on its head, although the economy has not had time 
to feel the impact, dramatic as those moves were. 
Now let me try to sum up as succinctly as possible what I perceive to be the essence 
of arguments about how fiscal and monetary policies are blamed as the cause, or the 
primary cause, of inflation. I hope that this seminar will make clear that the phenomenon 
called inflation affects all of us in a variety of ways, some adversely but also some 
quite beneficially. Few of us wish to admit that inflation has been beneficial. We 
would rather credit our own inherent wits -- good timing, investment acumen, and such 
when we chose to buy a house 10 years ago and now find that it has more than doubled in 
value. That was just prescience on our part! I have moved about and bought several 
houses in the last ten years, and I now find myself in the paradoxical position that I 
live in a house I couldn't afford if I had to buy it again. 
But irrespective of where each of us fits in, the message of this seminar is that 
inflation is not a simple phenomenon but rather a very complex phenomenon. If inflation 
can be described as a river -- some would say a raging torrent -- then just like all 
rivers it is fed by a number of tributaries. One of those tributaries is structural as-
pects of the economy that impede competition and speed inflation. The fact is that the 
economy doesn't function in a competitive sense as it is supposed to in terms of the 
economic theory contained in textbooks. Another aspect of inflation has to do with the 
fact that we are caught in global interdependence. For better or worse the united States 
is part of a world community. Events here can affect the external value of the dollar 
which then feeds back into our inflation process via the cost of imports. What I am 
suggesting to you as I describe fiscal and monetary aspects of inflation is that they 
are only part of the complex of factors bearing on inflation and in and of themselves 
are not so influential. What I am saying is that cliches such as that big government 
deficit spending is the cause -- not a cause but the cause -- of inflation are nonsense. 
Equally without validity is the accusation that monetary policy is the cause of inflation, 
that loose policy by the Federal Reserve which literally let the country get awash in 
money and credit is the cause. I could wish these simple explanations were true but they 
are not. They are only part of an explanation for a phenomenon that has long been in-
tractable in terms of our efforts to ameliorate it. 
Furthermore, I suggest that the intractability of inflation may be explain~d at 
least in part by our unwillingness to admit the complexity of inflation, that it is not 
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caused by one element alone that we have been unwilling to control. To explain further 
why inflation is not attributable just to a binge by the federal government I remind 
that many of us have learned to profit from inflation. It has been hard to generate a 
constituency in the American economy united in calling inflation public enemy number one 
because the shelter-cost component in the consumer price index that keeps rising en-
hances the net worth of those of us who are home owners. We are best off if we are net-
debtor homeowners. If there is one thing that economic theory is exactly correct about, 
it is that net debtors benefit from inflation. My point is that inflation.is not some-
thing that any of us can without ambivalence say is a terrible, terrible thing. 
To carry this still further, to the extent that America has gone on a borrowing 
binge, don't simply look to the friendly federal government but to the private sectors. 
Mortgage borrowing, consumer installment loans, all forms of borrowing whether to in-
crease productive capacity or take over existing assets -- these add up to immense sums. 
This private borrowing means there are an awful lot of net debtors who, if they are going 
to repay those debts, want to see the inflation in their assets continue. What we really 
want is selective inflation, the kind that selectively benefits us. Unfortunately, we 
don't get that kind very often. 
Yet even as net debtors we are beginning to realize, I believe, that inflation has 
gone beyond the point where the positive benefits to us as debtors exceed our collective 
vulnerability as consumers and citizens. The advantage of debt contracts paid in cheaper 
dollars is now outweighed by the disruptions and the distortions inflation has heaped on 
areas of the economy to which we are exposed as consumers. And certainly those of us 
who look beyond our installment contracts and think about our children admit, if we are 
honest with ourselves, that the process that has caused us to become house-rich has fore-' 
closed the opportunity for our children. They will be house-poor or house-less. In the 
same manner, the process that has caused farmers to become land-rich has foreclosed the 
entry of new young farmers into agriculture except under the most unusual circumstances. 
So I think there is beginning to emerge a constituency that has at last concluded 
that unless we can turn inflation back we are going to be in very difficult straits as a 
nation. Our institutions are not designed to operate well in the face of double digit 
inflation. 
What about the Federal Government and its contribution to inflation? Is big 
government the source of inflation? I suppose I could give you the traditional kind of 
answer. On the one hand, yes it is~ on the other, not necessarily. Forty years ago a 
man named John Maynard Keynes, whose reputation has been much abused, made a modest sug-
gestion that shook the world. That suggestion was that an industrialized society did 
not have to stand idly by and watch resources lie unused and productive capacity remain 
idle while waiting for some sort of natural forces to return the economy to equilibrium. 
Rather, he suggested that at a time when private demands were insufficient to put re-
sources to work there might be an appropriate role for the federal government to make 
expenditures which the private sector failed to make, in order to generate new employ-
ment. That was one half the coin that marked the Keynesian revolution. But John Maynard 
Keynes also said other things, not the least of which was that while it might be appro-
priate under conditions of slack in the economy for government to stimulate demand to be 
multiplied through the private sector, at other times it would be singularly inappropri-
ate for a government to pursue such a policy. At times when an economy was running in 
excess of capacity government should run a surplus. It should then cut back on expenses 
and increase taxes. Needless to say, to a people weary of depression and inaction, the 
hope Keynesian ideas represented was seized upon, although the Roosevelt administration 
was not initially enthusiastic. Stimulative spending worked in part, although it finally 
took World War II to put all resources to work. But many people who listened to what 
John Maynard Keynes said heard only the half about more spending. They didn't hear the 
part about sometimes raising taxes. That was promptly forgotten. 
During the very early stages of the war in Vietnam Arthur Okun and Gardner Ackley 
and other economists suggested to the new President, Lyndon Johnson, that the war costs 
in Vietnam coming as they did when the economy was really nearly fully employed were 
troublesome and would cause inflation. Lyndon Johnson was many things, among them a 
consummate politician, and one thing he definitely did not want to admit was the mag-
nitUde of the prospective effort in Vietnam and the cost to be imposed upon society. 
Perhaps he thought we could in fact have a war without paying for it through taxes. I 
submit to you that we are still paying the price of that war, because the spending for 
defense purposes at that time began to generate an inflationary process which continued 
at a moderate rate until OPEC hit us ,in 1973. OPEC introduced a very different kind of 
element that finally caused inflation to take on the momentum we have been familiar with 
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in the last 5 or 6 years. 
In short, there clearly are occasions when fiscal policy can contribute to the pro-
cess of inflation. Those times are typically identified by an economy running at or 
close to its effective capacity. It's like a farm that is producing all it can and all 
of a sudden a doubled population of the town makes more demands on that farm than can be 
satisfied. The market has a way of resolving that. It lets prices get bid up to clear 
the market at higher prices. When economies do that we call it inflation. When the 
average level of prices rises because of the pressure of excess demand on a relatively 
fixed supply we call that inflation. To the extent government through its spending con-
tributes, it is appropriate to say yes, fiscal policy can be a source of inflation. But 
in our recent experience it would be equally appropriate to say, "If government spending 
at relatively full employment stimulates inflation, is that not equally the case for the 
private sector?1I The answer is, yes. Additional spending above the economy's capacity 
creates inflation, irrespective of who does it. Anyone who looks at the data describing 
the growth of debt in both public and private sectors in recent years will be astounded 
to find that in both nominal terms and real terms the growth of debt in the private 
sector exceeds that of the public sector by a huge multiple. If we want to point a 
finger of blame we would have to direct it at each of us as much as to those people in 
Washington, D. C. Students of Shakespeare will recall a line in which Mark Antony says 
to Brutus, liThe fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars (that's Washington, D. C.) but 
in ourselves that we are underlings." We can't lay the blame for inflation on someone 
else if we are all indulging, for the best of reasons -- if prices will be higher tomor-
row, doesn't it make sense to buy today? -- in accelerated spending, much of it by 
borrowing. The Wall Street Journal reports that since September consumer installment 
debt has risen at an annual rate of 18 percent, tying an all time record rate. 
Let me now turn to Federal Reserve policy. I remind you that all else aside a 
government can be no more prudent or wise than its central bank permits it to be. The 
government doesn't just print pieces of paper called money. It works through an indirect 
process; it prints more elaborate pieces of paper called debts, called government secur-
ities in the market place, and as people exchange dollars for them the government gets 
the funds it needs. Now if government at any time lacks enough revenue to balance ex-
penditures, the debt paper is printed and if a market can be found for them the govern-
ment gets funds to operate. This procedure presupposes that when the government sets 
out to borrow, cash assets are available to enable people to purchase the seaurities. 
This is where the Federal Reserve comes in. Indeed, if the Federal Reserve wanted 
to be obstinately independent it would say to the government, in effect, you want to 
borrow: go ahead and borrow. But we won't make things easy for you. You (government 
borrowers) are going to have to bid money away from someone else. Only a peculiar cen-
tral bank would operate in that fashion. To the best of my knowledge, no central bank 
on God's earth operates so independently that it can ignore the wishes of the government 
to which it is a servant. Make no mistake about the independence of the Federal Reserve, 
it is operationally independent; but in the final analysis its charge and its respon-
sibility have to be both to the economy and to the government. In fact this is the 
reason central banks were created in the beginning -- to finance governments. 
Federal reserve authorities say they function on a policy of even keel. I would 
call it benign neutrality. When the Treasury borrows, the Fed will take the position 
that it will do nothing to make things greatly more advantageous, or more difficult. If 
money is readily available there isn't much of an issue. To the extent that money is not 
readily forthcoming from people, in effect the Federal Reserve ends up creating reserves 
to monetize the debt. In the latter case you could say, yes indeed, the Fed in its mone-
tary policy is guilty of contributing to inflation. Seldom if ever does the Fed actually 
take a position of not monetizing the debt by increasing reserves and thereby accommodating 
the federal government. It doesn't work that way. 
What happens more often than not is the following. The Fed does in fact try to con-
trol the volume of money and credit. The linkage between the real economy, the growth 
in money and credit, interest rates and reserves -- far from being as simple as some of 
my colleagues would suggest -- is somewhat . looser and more complicated. A person's 
decision today, for example, to shift money from a checking account to savings will af-
fect what happens to the rate of growth in money and credit and in reserves because the 
two kinds of deposit have different reserve requirements. Savings are not even included 
in one definition of money. If, for example, large money center banks were hit by a 
snowstorm which stopped collection of due · bills, float would accumulate. This would im-
pact on the growth of money, credit, reserve availability, and the like. Whenever the 
rate at which money turns over changes, obviOusly the capacity to finance economic activ-
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ity changes. In other words, the Federal Reserve in all its pristine glory and majesty 
is not wholly without resources and is far from wholly without power. 
At the same time, we should not imagine that a bunch of people in Washington sit at 
a master keyboard pushing buttons and turning knobs -- one knob is labeled reserves, 
another labeled money -- and when the blue knob is pressed just the right amount of money 
comes out. The real world is quite different. What the Federal Reserve does is to keep 
a very close watch on a certain set of key interest rates as a guide to their policies 
to allow the rate of growth in money and credit to proceed at a certain pace. 
In short, the Federal Reserve's operational techniques are about the following. 
First it is assumed that money is like most other commodities, and that at a higher price 
less is used than at a lower price. In effect the opportunity costs of money go up when-
ever interest rates go up. If interest rates are allowed to rise -- the opportunity costs 
of holding money -- less money will be held. There will be slower monetary growth. 
During the years of my close observation I kept my eye on the federal funds rate, 
that is, the interest rate charged by one bank to another bank for the use of overnight 
excess reserves. Fed policies were intended to achieve a certain level for that rate. 
To raise the rate the Fed would sell government securities in the market. As the Fed 
was paid with a check or cash, reserves -- the reserve base for money -- would be drawn 
down. Contrarily, if the Fed wanted to increase the amount of money in the banking system 
it would buy securities. The Fed watched the federal funds rate and Fed watchers watched 
the Fed with an incredible degree of closeness. Watchers would look for every little 
wiggle in that rate. When it went up or down a 32nd they would try to figure out just 
what the Fed was up to. Until very recently we were looking at changes in the federal 
funds rate of 1/8th or 1/16th of a percent. Since October 6 the money watchers have con-
cluded almost unanimously that the Fed is trying to maintain federal funds between a range 
of 12 and 17 percent. If I were the manager of the open market desk in New York City I 
would be delighted with that interpretation. It gives a lot of room to play around in! 
What was the actual pre-October situation? To begin with, it is true that the rate 
of growth in money and credit, by most standards for judgment, had been excessive in re-
cent months. It was excessive in the sense that if the economy's long run potential 
growth in output is, say, 3 percent and the rate of growth in money and credit is double 
that, in effect purchasing power is created which cannot be matched by real goods and 
services. Prices are then bid up. To this extent there is truth in the notion that over 
a long period of time there should be some reasonable correspondence between the rate of 
growth in money and credit and the economy's real long term growth capabilities. This 
does not mean, however, that at any given moment there is a magic number that if achieved 
would bring sweetness, light, and price stability. That isn't the way the real world 
works. 
It suffices to say that this summer and early fall Federal Reserve authorities were 
concerned for the r .apid rate of growth in money and credit, deterioration in the dollar 
externally, the incredible increases in the price of gold, and the speculative fever which 
spilled over into copper, zinc, lead, and sugar, commodities that were not in short supply. 
At the same time reports showed the economy's unemployment dropping to below 6 percent 
and in August jobs had grown by almost 600,000. Whoever in Washington takes the nation's 
pulse took it in August-September and found there were still a couple of beats left. The 
economy had life in it, production was rising, sales were going up. In short, the economy 
did not look as bad as everybody said it was. Inflation was rampant, the money supply was 
growing too rapidly, speculators were assaulting the dollar, the gold price was going 
out of sight. "We must act," the authorities said. Boy, did they act! 
Some consequences of what the Fed did are dramatic but not yet widely known. Dur-
ing my 15 years with the Federal Reserve system there were occasions when I was at vari-
ance, as I am now. But never before have I felt so sure that the monetary authorities, 
although acting on what they perceive , to be sound reasons, have embarked on a course that 
they themselves cannot chart and that brings consequences they are unprepared for. The 
incredible losses suffered in the nation's equity markets in the period shortly after the 
Federal Reserve acted dwarfed by a substantial amount those losses suffered in "The Great 
Depression." We lost almost $200 billion worth of net worth in the stock market in the 
short time after the Federal Reserve's October 6 announcement. 
The Fed took its action because Board members were concerned about inflation and 
because they were convinced that the economy was still highly employed. 
I feel absolutely sure that the short run effect of Fed actions will not be inhib-
itive to inflation. Quite the contrary, they will accelerate it as the cost of higher 
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interest rates and reduced credit availability channels through every sector of the 
American economy. And as money begins to dry up we will find, as many times in the past, 
the American economy is so structured that those least able to secure adequate financing 
and defend themselves will be hurt most. Business least able to cope with significant 
downturns of sales, those in short that are functioning in the competitive sector that 
our economic textbooks extol as exemplary of free enterprise capitalism -- not the 
Chrysler Corporation -- these will find themselves again sacrificing in the fight against 
inflation. 
I know what the Fed is trying to do. By reducing the availability and raising the 
cost of money and credit it is attempting to discourage people from borrowing and from 
spending and thereby to reduce the rate at which money and credit grow. That is a 
classical prescription for fighting a classical inflation. The only problem is that we 
don't have a classical inflation. We have a very strange kind of inflation. It is not 
one that arises because of an overheated economy in a classical sense but one that arises 
because OPEC has decided to jack up the price of energy. And by how much? By more than 
60 percent since December 1978. Americans spend approximately 7~ percent of their after-
tax disposable income on energy. That 7~ percent amounts to about $120 billion a year, 
so in a practical sense Americans have had imposed upon them during 1979 an energy tax 
in the form of inflation that is roughly equal to about $60 billion of purchasing power 
that has had to be diverted from households I normal buying plus bill-paying. 
A major flaw in trying to rein in the economy by monetary policy is that many parts 
of the economy and various kinds of price increases have their own behavior patterns. 
Food prices have been a part of our inflation, including the price of beef. I am not 
casting judgment on those increases, but for the life of me I have never believed that 
bulls or heifers are aware of or sensitive to federal monetary reserve policy. They are 
sensitive to the cattle cycle. The Fed may try to control business cycles but I hope 
it's not trying to control cattle cycles. That element of inflation is not going to be 
affected by monetary policy. 
Nor will the cost of medical care. Perhaps the cost of shelter, a significant con-
tributor to inflation, will be impacted by monetary policy; but I suggest the impact 
will be perverse, because as mortgage rates rise and construction loans costs rise, both 
will be reflected as a higher-priced shelter component of consumer prices. 
There are regulatory aspects to inflation, as some regulations have greater costs 
even though they also yield benefits. 
The dismal record of American productivity in recent years suggests as one solution 
to inflation that we somehow enhance productivity. The advice is to increase incentives 
for investment to modernize plant and get the capital cost of production in line with 
other industrial nations. I know few businessmen who will reassess their plans in light 
of current and short-term monetary policy. The McGraw-Hill survey suggests that in 
1980 business firms will make no increase in investment in real terms. 
The Federal Reserve Board's thrust probably is not yet ended and I think we should 
anticipate a peak short term interest rate of about 16 percent. When I was a deputy of 
the farm credit system we worried about how our farmer borrowers would react to interest 
rates reflecting the 7 percent the system had to pay. The farm credit system priced 
$3.35 billion in New York recently -- 6 and 9 month notes at an average yield of 14.40 
percent. 
Some persons really do believe that higher interest rates are the appropriate 
course to fight inflation, but I can't rally to their cause or join their army. Within 
limits we must have higher interest rates and reduced credit availability, and we need 
a fiscal policy that at least does not add to inflationary pressures by generating ex-
cessive demands. But we must realistically understand that an anti-inflation policy re-
quires a lot more. A concerted effort will be necessary on the part of Americans to 
reduce the rate at which they consume high priced energy, whether foreign or domestic. 
Only a concerted effort will get a handle on control of medical costs. Not for some 
time will the workings of the cattle cycle ease the red meat price situation. Only a 
cutting back on our expectations in housing will cause pressures such that housing 
prices and mortgage rates drop rather than rise. Government and the business community 
will face tortuous questions on regulations -- not to turn the clock back on regulations 
to where we have none, but also not mindlessly to plunge ahead with regulation without 
asking whether the marginal benefits are worth the marginal costs. In the final analysis 
it's going to take time and concerted effort to generate the kind of savings and invest-
ment environment within which productive investment can be made to raise productivity 
and to help us get our costs under control. 
24 
Inflation control is going to require one other element that I have saved for last 
because it is probably the most painful element of all. It is a measure of discipline 
and sacrifice on the part of the American people, one that they have not yet been willing 
to demonstrate. Inflation like a coin has two sides. One side, we all agree, is called 
rising prices. That side of the coin we say we are going to do away with. The economist 
in me says, "Wait a minute. Flip that coin over. II What does the other side say? It 
says rising incomes. That's what rising prices are, in the final analysis. They are 
payment to different factors of production and they represent incomes. If we are agreed 
that to get rid of inflation we1ve got to get rid of rising prices, what does that por-
tend in terms of the other side of the coin? It means that we have to be willing to make 
some sacrifices in terms of incomes, in terms of income growth at the very least. We 
have got to disabuse ourselves of the notion that each year we have an increase in our 
wages corning to us for no reason other than we got one last year. For every American 
who is serious about inflation it will be ,a time of testing, a time when businesses are 
no longer able to protect their desired margins, a time when wage earners can no longer 
expect to be fully protected from last year's inflation if they don't want more inflation 
next year. The same disciplinary rule holds for people who earn dividends or rents or 
what have you. 
In short, there is no single simple cause of inflation, and there is no single, 
simple painless cure for inflation. There is only one cure for inflation and that is 
one which involves an effort that will extend over many years on many fronts and which 
will engage the entire American society -- business, labor, all of us -- in a conservative 
effort involving discipline and sacrifice. If we are serious about fighting, this is what 
it takes. If we are not serious, why don't we simply admit it and enjoy it as long as we 
can until the bust comes? 
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HOW INFLATION LOOKS TO FARMERS 
James Boillot 
Missour i Farmer and Farm Leader 
Columbia, Missouri 
If I might paraphrase the topic, "How Inflation Looks to Farmers, II I would rather 
say, "How Farmers Look to Inflation," or "How Farmers Look at Inflation." I think I 
could sum that up in two words: number one is fear, number two is frustration. 
Agriculture's fear of inflation is really a double fear. One is that we are afraid 
inflation will continue, and the other is that we are afraid it will end. That's the 
paradox of where we are. 
Most of us farmers recognize that we have built up some net worth values. We have 
built a farm economy that shows increased worth year after year. On the other hand some 
farmers have probably reached a cash flow position that depends on inflation. 
Two weeks ago I went into a machinery dealer, talking about buying a piece of 
equipment. His comment was, "You ought to buy it now before the first of the year be-
cause a price increase will come after the first of the year." I said I wasn't really 
sure I need it. He replied, "Well, two years from now it will be 20 percent higher if 
things keep going up." This point of view presses upon you. 
The other side of it is that we're afraid it will end. Some of us have extended 
ourselves to the point where, if inflation should end, cash flow would become a very 
real reality. There is uncertainty as to what the conditions would be if it should end. 
Frustration. This shows up in many ways. Most of the concerns and uncertainties 
Stahl and other speakers describe apply to agriculture the same as to ' the rest of our 
economy. We have some differences but basically there is similarity. Rising costs in 
production worry us. In our own operation fuel cost this year is going to be more 
than double last year. Once a small percentage of production cost, it is now my third 
highest expenditure in farming. 
One of the other things we are experiencing on the farm is rapidly increasing hid-
den costs. These are costs that you don't realize. Persons familiar with commodity 
futures know about IIbasis,1I the difference between what I get at a local elevator versus 
the commodity futures quotations. Three years ago in soybeans we were looking at a bas-
is of 18 to 22 or 23 cents. This year our basis at harvest time got up to nearly 75 
cents. This is a cost that we really aren't aware of because when we take our soybeans 
to market we ask only what we will be paid per bushel. But the difference between what 
we get and its price in the ultimate market is what I would call a hidden cost. 
Another frustration may not be linked to inflation but is the tremendous price 
variations we are experiencing in our commodities. I can remember that in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, we talked about fluctuations in soybean and corn prices of 3, 4, 5, or 
6 cents through harvest. This year I sold my soybeans straight from the harvest. Yes-
terday the price of beans was $1.47 below what I sold mine for less than six weeks be-
fore. 
Price swings of this size put an uncertainty into agriculture that may not be found 
so much in other segments of society. 
Another source of frustration is statements by news media. The average farmer has 
a hard time understanding why we say a rising value of gross national product is good, 
but an increase in food costs is inflationary and bad. Then there is the buying-selling 
differential for the products that we manufacture. The word may be unusual but farmers 
are in the business of manufacturing. My cow herd, my sow herd, is my manufacturing 
plant. Why my manufactured products are not considered on the same basis as some others 
I do not understand. 
Another concern was raised by Sheldon Stahl. If we really want inflation to stop 
we all need to look seriously at cost of living guarantees, at Congressional salary in-
creases, at the attitude that this year I must make more than I did last year. This 
has got to come to the point where we are willing to say that it is .in the interest of 
this country that we come to grips with inflation. If in fact we believe this, I, for 
my part, will take my position in trying to abide personally with noninflationary be-
havior. 
What is the biggest problem inflation is causing farmers toda~? I think it is 
management. Farm management is more difficult today than at any tlme, certainly in my 
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history of operation. It1s the unknown that makes for difficulty in management. Do you 
maintain high inventories in the face of wide fluctuations in price? Do you buy to beat 
a price rise? I guess the biggest problem of all today is that many of us in agriculture 
have a net worth that far exceeds our dreams, and due to cash flow problems have borrow-
ed against it to where we can't service the debt load that we carry. I think this is 
probably the most severe problem that is facing American agriculture today. When you go 
to the bank or your credit system, it's not a problem of having collateral. It's a prob-
lem of being able to service the debt load that has resulted from declines in cattle 
prices, declines in some other prices, at the same time that our costs have gone up. 
The net worth condition in agriculture, a book value that exceeds earning power, is 
one of the critical issues for a healthy agriculture. I was amused about three weeks ago 
when I read an editorial in the Wall Street Journal about the economic health of American 
agriculture. The author used a hypothetical 440-acre farm that increased in value by 
14 percent a year. He took a $1,600-an-acre "minimal price" (a few of us will still sell 
for that), but at any rate his end result was that this hypothetical farmer's net worth 
had increased $84,000 and one of the real problems in our society was that we did not tax 
that $84,000 increase. Now, I can laugh, I can make light of it, but I take seriously 
that someone believes this is worthy of an editorial page. The net worth versus cash 
flow situation in American agriculture today is going to have to be addressed and it is 
not very well understood. Inflation is creating wealth in agriculture but a net worth 
statement won't feed your family very long unless you sellout. This is one of the myths 
that inflation has caused for us. 
The farmer who has held real assets for a period of time has realized some net worth 
increases during inflation, and as said several times at this seminar tremendous problems 
are created for the young farmer wanting to enter. The situation is similar in other 
parts of the economy such as housing, but the pressure on the young man wanting to enter 
agriculture is tremendous. 
I add one word about the tendency to borrow against net worth, and then be unable 
to service loans. I went in to my banker to renew a note. The banker told me, II Jim, 
you didn't get any new money this time, you recognize that, don't yoU?1I -- almost an 
attitude that when you come in it's not for repayment but to add to the principal. That's 
what farmers have been doing. I think my experience -- my banker's thinking I failed to 
borrow more because of an oversight -- is a testament to agriculture today. But I also 
believe there is a lack of understanding among people generally of the nature of finan-
cing of farming today. To illustrate further, a young reporter came out and wanted to 
do an article on the cattle cycle. As I had sold a cow herd, she wanted to know what 
economic conditions would cause me to do this. I don't think there is understanding 
that farmers often operate under tight cash flow over a period of years, with increasing 
debt load, in the hope of being able to repay at some time in the future. 
To sum this up, the underlying question facing American agriculture today is 
whether it is a solid expectation that we will have a built-in 7 to 10 percent increase 
in value of assets annually. If we knew the answer to that, we could manage. Or if we 
as a nation were to get our shoulder to the wheel and stop inflation, we could manage 
under those constraints. The underlying question is that we don't know what to expect, 
and that is where I believe agriculture is today. 
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HOW INFLATION LOOKS TO WAGE WORKERS 
Daniel J. McVey 
Secretary-Treasurer, Missouri State Labor 
Council, AFL-CIO 
Inflation to the working man is that when you got that last raise you go home and 
the wife says the groceries are too high, the da~hter needs $35 for a new blouse, and 
the son wants $30 for tennis shoes and, the final blow, the heat and power bill comes 
and it is more than the house payment. 
That's inflation to the working man. And I think it is inflation to all of us. 
One of the things I have learned in the last year is that there are parallels be-
tween the farmer and the working man. For too many years it has been assumed that one 
is on one side of the fence and the other is on the other. That's just not true. 
Missouri had a very good economy last year, as it gained something like 50,000 jobs. 
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But hidden among the statistics was the loss of 22,500 jobs, due in part to displace-
ment by imports. Likewise, we are losing 2,000 farms a week in the United States. In 
Missouri we went from 180,000 farms to 153,000 to approximately 130,000 now. 
The,biggest problem being fought in labor just now is the corporate mentality. 
When Eng1ne Charlie Wilson, President Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense, said that what 
is good for General Motors is good for the country, he might have been justified. But 
it's not necessarily that way with Shell Oil now, because the company is corporate in-
ternationale. 
So we are being faced with the loss of jobs and the gain of jobs and trying to pull 
it all together and keep our people working, and maintaining a decent living in spite of 
inflation. 
Interesting enough, even the wages negotiated in union contracts, which involve 
approximately 24 percent of the workers in the United States, were 5~ percent below in-
flation. As Mr. Boillot said about farmers, we have a fear. We get jittery. Hurry up 
and bUy now; pay with inflated dollars later, before the bubble bursts. This attitude 
permeates our people the same as the agricultural people. 
That's an individual's defensive reaction, but jobs are the name of the game. In 
order to keep our people working, we are constantly striving to work in areas that we 
have not done before. We are trying to get better understanding. Too often, the work-
er who has a job doesn't really pay attention to inflation as long as he has money in 
his pocket. The worker who is out of a job is in a mental depression and he doesn't 
care what the rest of the people think. We react more than we think ahead, and al-
though this behavior is no more than a symptom we probably will have to take the cure 
of more public concern along with farmers and others. 
When we talk about inflation, we have to talk about energy. There are 1,500,000 
corporations in the United States. Five hundred of them control 80 percent of the prof-
its. Eighty-five percent of all the exports in the United States are shipped by one 
percent of the companies. From 1972 to 1978 we increased our exports by 3~ times, up 
to $144 billion. The technology is there and some kinds of productivity have improved 
but we are now running at a $28 billion deficit because we have gotten into a dilemma 
in oil imports -- in energy. 
Much inflation is not related to unionization. Hospitalization is one of the 
fastest rising costs. It is the least unionized of all industries -- it is basically a 
$2.90 wage industry. Yet there is no stopping the rise in rates which go as high in 
St. Louis as about $200 a day. Labor has not had anything to do with many of the prob-
lems in inflation and we are in the same position that the farmer is on prices. Take 
housing. In 1949, 30 percent of your house was labor. In 1959 it was 26 percent. In 
1969 it was 21 percent and in 1979 it is now 16 percent of your house. I think you will 
find that the outlay that a family puts out for its food is the same percentage-wise. 
It has gone from 30 percent of income down to approximately 16 percent. So the farmer 
and the working people have basically received a diminishing share of the value of 
products, and have been seriously affected by inflation. 
To digress a bit from my topic, I think energy developments are going to put labor 
and the farmer closer together. People are talking about gasohol, but I am thinking 
more broadly. I have been working with many farm groups and I say to you that the 
future of America is in the hands of the farmer. Since 1969 we apexed in the amount of 
oil in the world. It is going down, down. I illustrate with a story. A man in the 
highway department is told to paint the lane-divider stripe. He is given a small paint 
brush and bucket. He starts down with it. The first day he does a mile. The second 
day he does a half mile and the third day, about a quarter of a mile. The boss asked, 
"Hey, you did fine the first day; what's going on?" The man answered that it wouldn't 
be so bad if he didn't have to go back so far to the bucket. 
Basically this is what is happening in the oil industry. We have gotten out all 
the easy oil and we have mined all the accessible resources and the exponential curve 
is appearing in oil. We are not going to be able to find it as easily, and when we 
start paying for it we are not going to have any money left over. After about 25 years, 
you can forget oil. There are only 45 years left for uranium, as we know it now. If 
more plants are added that figure drops to 25 years. I don't happen to be a believer 
in the breeder type uranium. 
So we are looking at energy that has to be renewable energy. That's the farmer's 
role. I honestly believe that there lies the future for society. 
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We are going to have to go full tilt to resolve the energy dilemma and the prob-
lem is leadership. I have never seen anyone push a chain. And that's what people are, 
that's what laboring people are, that's what the majority of us are, a section ofa 
chain, or maybe a link. Someone has to pull it. Someone has to lead it. And that's the 
way it's going to have to be. 
If this means that the federal government or the state government is going to have 
to start putting power projects into operation to show what can be done, so be it. It 
is not in the interest of Mobil Oil or Exxon or any of the other firms to shift our 
energy sources because they can't put a meter on the sun. 
I feel that in the next five years we are going to see a tremendous change in our 
life style, as Mr. Stahl basically told us. We are going to have to say, unions and 
farmers alike, that we want to stop inflation and we are willing to bear our share of 
the burden. As an example, in 1972 unions were willing to accept wage and price controls 
under President Nixon. What happened, though, was that the farmer and the wage earner 
didn't get a fair deal. It doesn't do any good to make $50 an hour if bread is $75 a 
loaf. We understand that the trend has to be turned and it's going to take leadership. 
I hope seminars such as this one help to build the understanding people need for getting 
and responding to leadership. 
# # # # # # # 
HOW INFLATION LOOKS TO CONSUMERS 
Eunice (Pat) Lieurance 
Professor of Family Economics 
and Management 
To many of us, the word "consumer" triggers an image of faceless people, probably 
housewives, pushing carts, gathering groceries in some unidentified supermarket. Some 
of us mentally visualize another group, mostly young, mostly female, carrying picket 
signs, protesting the unfairness to the consumer of some hard working businessman; or a 
Ralph Nader exclaiming to a crowd of excited consumers the grave injustices faced in the 
marketplace. In other words, we have a tendency to perceive "consumers" in a negative 
way. 
The consumers we're considering at this time, however, are real people about whom 
we have very positive feelings. They are our familie~; our aged parent(s) living on a 
fixed income; our adult children entering the housing market for the first time. They 
are our neighbors; the people we speak to as we shop; and the families whom we vaguely 
know. 
Inflation has hit all of us. It has hurt some of us; it has helped some of us, 
but we have a fear it will hurt more -- which is probably true. While inflation erodes 
our purchasing power, the degree to which erosion takes place depends basically on two 
things: (1) our consumption pattern, and (2) our income. 
Looking at the latter first, the purchasing power of income has ~ncreased very 
little in this decade. An Associated Press-NBC News poll showed that inflation his been 
felt the most by blue collar families and those earning less than $25,000 a year. In-
dividuals and families who must survive on a fixed income certainly feel the bite of in-
flation more than those who have had incomes that increase somewhat. Retirees consti-
tute a large portion of people on fixed incomes, but even among this group there are 
great differences. Retired federal workers have actually gained purcqasing power over 
the past 25 years while those on social security have lost about 20%. Retirees on 
private pension plans must have fared even worse in many cases. And women over 65 have 
half the retirement income of men over 65. 
The poor, as a group, suffer more from inflation than the more affluent because a 
larger portion of their income goes for the basic things that are needed for survival --
food, housing, and energy, which have increased in price more than most other categories 
in the CPI. Other groups of people who are most vulnerable to inflation are the semi-
skilled or unskilled workers, because they are more likely to become unemployed; the 
1 
2 
"poll: Americans Say Inflation Has Cut Standard of Living" 
Tribune, October 21, 1979. 
(AP) , Columbia Daily 
"Any Lessons from 25 Years of Inflation?", 
1979. 
U. S. News and World Report, July 16, 
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poorly educated workers; and households headed by a female. 
In a 1978 study by Caplovitz, those who were objectively described as "most vulner-
able" to inflation were most likely to perceive themselves as suffering. The one excep-
tion was the retired, who although objectively "hard hit" by inflation did not feel any 
significant financial strain. This finding may be attributed to their higher asset 
level in general, and lower level of unmet II wants.,,3 
Of course, there are those who benefit, or at least are not hurt, from inflation. 
Those who own assets that rise in price faster than other prices, and those who have 
incomes protected by escalator clauses do well in inflation -- although the escalator 
clause needs to be looked at very carefully. The CPI tends to overstate the real cost 
of living, and therefore is itself inflationary. Also among the beneficiaries of infla-
tion are those, as a University of Michigan economist puts it, "who happen to be in the 
right bus iness at the right time. ,,4 
Our consumption patterns certainly are directly related to how inflation looks to 
us. Consumption patterns are influenced by many things -- values, age, sex and number 
of family members, general state of health, resourcefulness of family members, region of 
the country in which we live, the store of assets we possess, and many others. 
Unfortunately, many of our policies only make the situation worse. For example, 
the family -- usually young -- that is entering the housing market for the first time 
is vulnerable. Not only are the couple attempting to buy housing at an inflated price, 
but also their monthly payments are higher than a few years ago because of high interest 
rates. Also their savings for the down payment have steadily lost purchasing power be-
cause of the low return on savings. New mortgages are beginning to show up, but even if 
the " new mortgages" help some families individually, they wonlt do anything for the in-
flation spiral. 
When economic policies involving the family are developed, the tendency is to look 
at the population as uniformly of a one-earner, two parent, two child family. Actually, 
less than 20 percent of U. S. families fit that description. One in five children under 
18 years of age live in a one parent family. We need to start paying attention to them 
as well as others. 
Our tax structure certainly is inequitable. Poor people are hit more harshly by 
income as well as sales taxes. The wealthy have all kinds of tax advantages and also 
the money and lobbying power to protect these advantages. 
Most of us are aware of the inequity of small savers vs. large savers. There are 
numerous other examples of inequities in our policies that are unfair in the best of 
times. The increased discrimination resulting from inflation is a national tragedy, in 
my estimation. 
What, then, are families doing to cope with this situation -- trying to maintain 
their level of living in the face of lost purchasing power? Several things are happen-
ing. First of all, savings are down. Dollars normally going into savings are being 
spent for family living. Some families are withdrawing dollars already in savings to 
meet their needs. Some families go deeper into debt to cover living expenses. Concern 
is being felt about families I refinancing their homes and using the equity built up by 
inflation to maintain their level of living. Other families are coping by increasing 
income, i.e., the breadwinners holding two jobs and/or other family members going to 
work. And, of course, many ate becoming more prudent shoppers, shopping for bargains, 
etc. But this is all a los ing battle. Many have already reached the II end of the rope, II 
so to speak. 
Because of the differences in the impact of inflation on various families and in 
families I ability to cope, generalizations are difficult to make. But perhaps a few 
are in order. 
Inflation appears to have become a "mind set" for the "average American." Itls 
becoming a catch-all term for all the uncertainties and frustrations people are feeling. 
This is dangerous as it indicates an acceptance which prevents people from fighting 
back. Psychologists say that when people feel that they have lost control of a situ-
ation, they generally respond by becoming either aggressive or withdrawn. This seems 
3 Caplovitz, David, Making Ends Meet, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979. 
4 
"Why Do Consumers Fear Inflation?" Newsletter, Institute for Social Research, 
The University of Michigan, Spring, 1979. 
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to be happening to us. We either refuse to believe that inflation is a serious problem, 
or we just don't want to think about it -- or both. Too many people are still waiting 
for someone to come along with a simple answer. 
Paul Volcker, head of the Federal Reserve Board, has recently said that the stand-
ard of living of the average American has to suffer as the price of stopping inflation. 
To many, this has already happened. 
The Institute of Social Research in Michigan conducts monthly surveys of consumers I 
attitudes. The August report shows a continued deterioration of consumer sentiment over 
the past two years. Thirty-eight percent of the families surveyed felt they were worse 
off financially than they were a year earlier. Thirty-three percent said they were 
better off. The other twenty-nine percent don't know, don't care, or perhaps don't want 
to think about it. 
In the same study it was found that twenty-five percent expected their financial 
situation to worsen in the next twelve months while only twent5-three percent expected it to improve. We1re rapidly becoming a nation of pessimists. 
However, there is something we can do. First of all, we must realize we have a 
serious problem. Ignoring it is not going to make it go away. 
We must also accept responsibility. Over the years, we have developed the idea 
that the more we consume, the better our lives. This is simply not true. We must lower 
our sights so far as standard of living is concerned and really tighten our belts in 
spending. And this must be done on a massive scale. What may be good for one person 
may not be good in the aggregate. We can certainly modify our lifestyles without sacri-
ficing quality of life. This, of course, takes time. 
Another change that may be needed is for families to improve their skill in resol-
ving family conflict. We may find that reduced consumption translates into eliminating 
duplication, e.g., in TV sets, hair dryers, automobiles, even bathrooms. Elimination 
of these duplications may create disagreements on how resources should be used. 
We must also be responsible for our own productivity. This is closely linked to 
consumption. We need to be productive in our homes, in our place of employment, and in 
our communities. But we must be productive without being wasteful. 
Certainly, there is a spark of optimism for consumers if we can all get together 
and begin to move in approximately the same direction, pushing our policymakers ahead. 
Perhaps the best way to react to inflation is for all consumers to heed the wisdom 
of the philosophical comic strip character, Pogo, who said, "We have met the enemy, and 
they are us. II 
5 Consumer Surveys, Newsletter, Institute for Social Research, The Univer~ity of 
Michigan, Autumn, 1979. 
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HOW AGRICULTURE FARES IN AN INFLATIONARY ECONOMY 
Bruce Gardner 
Professor of Agricultural Economics 
Texas A&M University 
We all know how we are faring and we all know, at least roughly, the current course 
of inflation. And we have data on how farmers as a group are doing economically. The 
difficulties arise in trying to establish the connection between inflation and the 
economic condition of agriculture. How much of what we observe today is due to infla-
tion and how much would we be seeing even if the rate of inflation in 1979 had been 3 
percent instead of 12 percent, 
Between April and September 1979 the average price received by farmers for wheat 
increased from $3.01 to $3.84 per bushel. How much of this was due to an acceleration 
of inflation or inflationary expectations? And if inflation can explain this, can it 
also explain the fact that over this same period the average price received by farmers 
for beef cattle fell from $72.40 to $66.90 per hundred pounds? 
What we need is a theory of the effects of inflation. Macroeconomists have con-
centrated more on theories of the causes of inflation. This seminar's program reflects 
that fact. The sum total of theorizing on the subject adds up to a Tower of Babel. The 
problem is not unawareness of causes of inflation; it is that we name too many. If all 
the things said to cause inflation really did, every part of the world would have had 
accelerating inflation since Day One. 
A theory of inflation is a mechanism by which we put the E~~~~~~~n in terms we are 
familiar with. This gives us a feeling of understanding. It increases our sense of 
security. The simplest form of theory is analogy or simile. Inflation is like a run-
away train. It is like a snowball; it rolls along picking up power and momentum of 
its own accord until something drastic stops it. Inflation is a disease, a malignant 
growth, a cancer. 
All our analogical understandings of inflation suggest that it is bad. Certainly 
it's not something you'd like to live with. 
~.Y-_._isgeneralization .! One reason we I re short on 
of inflation ·inaY-"be'··tha·t"··o"ne· ~annot generalize about it. 
helped by inflation depends on your particular position. 
cash, machinery, acquired skills, gold, or land? Do you 
interest rate are you paying for your debts? 
theories about the consequences 
Whether you are harmed or 
Are your assets inves-ted in 
lack assets altogether? What 
Yet at one level there should be no problem about the cau~es of inflation. 
Harold Breimyer's definition of inflation is standard -- it is a pronounced tendency 
for prices of goods and services to rise. But if all prices rise, the effects should 
cancel themselves out. It's as if we were to wake up one morning and find that every-
thing in the world was 10 percent heavier. How could we tell? · The things I weigh are 
10 percent heavier but so are my muscles and so are the balance-weights. All our 
pointer readings are unchanged. 
Why shouldn't inflation be like this? Everything costs 10 percent more but all our 
incomes go up by 10 percent. So our well-being is unchanged. Of course, it doesn't 
work this way. Question: Why not? And are the. departures from IIneutralityll of infla-
tion random or systematic. In particular, can we predict how agriculture is likely to 
fare? 
A Theory or .Two 
Before considering some pertinent facts, let us first look at a couple of theories. 
In the l890s the theory became popular that inflation was good for agriculture. 
This was the basic point of William Jennings Bryan I s II CJ:-os.a..._o..f .. ..Q...Q.J..o.lI speech. Actually, 
there was no evidence at that time that inflation was good. But there was plenty of 
observation that deflation was bad. Believe it or not, between 1865 and 1895 cost-of-
living indexes declined on the order of one-third, while the prices of farm products 
fell by over one-half. It was natural to believe that reversal of this trend would help 
farmers out. I 
The other theoretical position is that inflation is bad for farmers because farm 
product prices rise less rapidly than farm input prices. This position has been taken 
by Luther Tweeten of Oklahoma State University. He and Steve Griffen in one of the few 
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empirical investigations of the subject find evidence that "national inflation exerts 
a real price effect on the fanning industry, reducing the parity ratio" (p. 10).1 Their 
evidence is derived from annual data on prices received and paid by farmers for the 
years 1920-1969. This evidence is particularly striking in view of the common belief 
that the inflationary periods of World War II and the Korean War were good for farmers. 
One could combine the two theories by saying that the parity ratio will decline 
in periods of inflation and that it will decline under deflation, too. That is, farm 
product prices tend always to fall relative to farm input prices. In fact, this seems 
to be the case. The reason is basically that there is a continuing trend towards getting 
more agricultural output from the same inputs, i.e., productivity growth. The point for 
the present discussion is this: trends in the parity ratio are not a matter of infla-
tion at all. We should be wary of the temptation to bring all cur-rent economic problems 
under the inflationary umbella. 
The real inflationary problems seem more likely to arise from shocks to prices and 
costs and the resulting adjustments made necessary. To get a feel for what has been 
going on lately, there is no substitute for considering the actual data. As politicians 
like to say (when it suits their purposes), "Let's look at the record." 
Figure 1 compares average prices received by farmers (USDA data) with the overall 
Consumer Price Index (Bureau of Labor Statistics), an indicator of general inflationary 
Figure 1 
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pressure. Both indexes have a base of 1967=100. At the beginning of 1970 both were at 
112, reflecting a 3-year rise of 12 percent -- the Vietnam War inflation that seemed so 
intolerable at the time. In the fall of 1971 the Nixon price controls probably helped 
keep the lid on for a year or so. After that began the uptrend so clearly apparent. 
While farm product prices lagged the CPI briefly, in late 1972 they began to out-
pace the CPl. After sagging, farm prices in 1978 and 1979 were once again above the 
CPI index. 
Whether farmers are able to benefit from a price rise depends on the cost side. 
Also shown in Figure 1 is the trend in prices paid. Prices received surged ahead at 
first, but prices paid made a strong comeback in the later 1970s. We recall that the 
OPEC shock that quintupled oil prices occurred in 1972. 
lLuther Tweeten and Steven Griffen, IIGeneral Inflation and the Farming Economy,1I 
Research Report P-732, Oklahoma Experiment Station, March 1976. 
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Figure 2 presents the consumer side of the issue, as food prices are compared with 
the CPI. Food prices have not been as volatile as either prices received or prices paid 
by farmers. However, over the period, especially in 1973-74 and in 1978-79, they in-
creased more rapidly than the CPl. By the end of the 1970s the price of food will have 
outpaced other goods and services consumers buy by about 10 percent, compared with the 
beginning of the decade. Figure 2 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND FOOD PRICE INDEX 
Percent 1967 = 100 
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Neither of these charts allows a good visual assessment of which prices led and 
which lagged ove·r the period. Figure 3 may be more informative, as it presents deflated 
Figure 3 
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1977 1978 1979 
values for food prices and farm prices received and paid (deflated by the CPI). Thus, 
an upward trend shows an increase in the real value of all the goods. All three in 
fact sho""" increases of 10 percent, roughly, over the decade. 
Some ideas that "everyone knows" are confirmed by these data, but others are not. 
Early in the 1970s, farm product prices fell, but food prices held roughly steady. This 
is what we all expect. But in 1972, when farm prices rose, food prices did not, for a 
time. The idea that food prices go up when farm prices rise but do not fall when farm 
prices fall is not borne out by these data. Food prices are undoubtedly stickier, but 
they are not obviously more sticky in one direction than in the other. An overall index 
of relative gains from stickiness, obtained by integrating the differences between de-
flated food and prices received data, suggests that over the 10 years farmers have 
slightly held the upper hand. 
Price data can be misleading. The behavior of farm prices is not necessarily re-
vealing about the bottom line of farmers' interests, which is the net income earned 
from farming. Analysis of prices leaves out changes in productivity and costs. For 
evidence on this subject it is necessary to look at data on net farm income in different 
inflationary environments. The table presents data on annual inflation rates and 
corresponding food price increases, real farm incomes, and real equity gains in the 
period 1948-1978. 
Data in the table indicate that the best years for real farm income were 1948, 
1951, and 1973. In these years, the rate of inflation was 2.4, 5.9, and 8.8 percent, 
respectively. The worst years were 1964, 1968, and 1970, with inflation rates of 4.7, 
1.4, and 5.5, respectively. Compared with surrounding years, the data do not show a 
strong apparent connection in either direction between inflation and farm income. 
A regression on the data for real farm income gives this equation: 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
-1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Income = 3.2 + 26.6 Inflation + 0.68 Income lagged. 
(1.8) (6.1) 
The Rate of Retail Price Inflation and Agriculture's 
Real Income and Wealth Variables 
Rate of Price Rise1 
CPI 
2.4 
-1.8 
5.8 
5.9 
0.9 
0.6 
-0.5 
0.4 
2.9 
3 .. 0 
1.8 
1.5 
1.5 
0.7 
1.2 
1.6 
1.2 
1 .. 9 
3.4 
3.0 
4.7 
6.1 
5.5 
3.4 
3.4 
8 .. 8 
12.2 
7.0 
4.8 
6.8 
~~ "O 
Food 
-0.8 
- 3.7 
9.6 
7.4 
-1.1 
-1.3 
-1.6 
-0.9 
3.1 
2.8 
2 .. 2 
-0.8 
3.1 
-0.9 
1.5 
1.9 
1.4 
3.4 
3.9 
1 .. 2 
4.3 
7.2 
2.2 
4.3 
4.7 
20.1 
12.2 
6 .. 5 
0.6 
8.0 
~1.2 
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Real (Def1at~d) 
Farm Income 
(Bi1. Do1s.) 
24.13 
17.64 
18.58 
20.17 
18.49 
15.98 
15.03 
13.84 
13.26 
12.09 
14.08 
11.56 
12.28 
11.83 
11.58 
11 .. 23 
9.25 
11.42 
11.41 
9.60 
8.92 
10 .. 01 
9.30 
9.66 
11.94 
22.45 
16.53 
14.31 
10.35 
10.20 
13.75 
Real (Def1ate~) 
Eguity Gains 
(Bi1. Do1s.) 
19.64 
2.69 
- 8.05 
- 3.49 
- 0.64 
4.22 
6.63 
2.30 
10.07 
9.08 
- 2.54 
3.98 
3.72 
2.36 
3.19 
9.78 
4.20 
- 1.21 
6.93 
- 1.59 
- 5.88 
4.81 
16.53 
28.84 
-10.71· 
14.78 
20.42 
2.53 
(41. ) 
"Income" and lIinf~ation" are the numbers from the table. Lagged income is included to 
account for trends and because we want to consider the effects of inflation given other 
elements of the economic environment. The coefficient of 26.6 means that a 1 percent-
point increase in the rate of inflation is associated with a $266 million increase in 
real farm income. In other words, it says that if 1978's inflation had been 8 percent 
instead of 9 percent, real farm income would have been about 2 percent lower. This is 
not a large effect, but it does suggest that farmers have in the postwar period been 
slight net gainers in inflationary episodes. 
If we include real equity gains, and define "full income" as the sum of the last 
two columns of the table, the regression result is: 
Full income = 5.9 + 60.5 Inflation + 0.15 Full income lagged. 
(2.2) 
The estimated effect of inflation is a little stronger and more positive when capital 
gains are included. The figures in parenthesis are the "t" ratio. 
These regressions are of course much too crude for concluding that inflation has 
actually caused higher farm incomes. The causal factors could well be variables that 
are not included in the regression. Nonetheless, the results given here and other 
studies are evidence against the proposition that inflation has generally tended to 
harm agriculture. 
The effects of inflation are diverse upon different parts of agriculture. Partic-
ular individuals are differently affected depending on the configuration of assets that 
they hold. Beyond this, can we identify particular sectors within agriculture that 
tend to be affected by inflation in particular ways? 
One such effect may arise from the keying of commodity speculators on certain pro-
ducts as a hedge against inflation. The one most often cited is soybeans. This adds 
volatility to soybean prices but would also mean that soybean producers would tend to 
benefit from inflation. 
Adaptation to inflationary expectations involves complicated adjustments that are 
not easily spelled out or tested in economic theory or data. I would just like to con-
sider adjustments in the price outlook itself under changed inflationary environments. 
It is usually impossible to observe expectations since they are psychological phenomena. 
Fortunately, the USDA publicly reveals its expectations. Let us consider how USDA 
expectations changed as the inflationary outlook worsened in early 1979. The first 
forecasts for prices of 1979/80 grain prices were published in May 1979. For wheat and 
corn they were: 
Wheat Corn 
May 1979 1979-80 price, $3.35 1979-80 price, $2.25 
1979-80 supply, 2833 1979-80 supply, 8463 
mil. bu. mil. bu. 
The latest USDA forecasts are: 
October 1979 1979-80 price, $3.75 1979-80 price, $2.50 
1979-80 supply, 3038 1979-80 supply, 8663 
mil .. bu. mil. bu. 
Footnotes from table on previous page: 
lChanges in price indexes from December to December. Source: Economic Report of 
the President, 1979 .. 
2Net income including inventory adjustments deflated by the CPI in 1967 dollars. 
Source: USDA, Farm Income Statistics .. 
3changes in farm asset owners' equity, Jan. 1 to Jan. 1, each level deflated by the 
month's CPI (1967=100), in 1967 dollars. Source: USDA, Balance Sheet of the 
Farming Sector, 1979. 
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Between May and October the forecast price increased 12 percent for wheat and 11 percent 
for corn. Hypothesis: this reflects accelerated inflationary expectations. But did 
the decline in the expected Soviet grain crop account for the higher price outlook? In 
reality it was probably more than offset bV better U. S. crop prospects. The Soviet 
shortfall could hardly have added more than 8 to 10 million tons, or 300 to 400 million 
bushels, to U. S. grain exports, but between May and October the USDA production fore-
casts increased about 400 million bushels for wheat and corn. 
If inflationary expectations changed the outlook for crop prices, what about live-
stock? Between April and August of 1979 the USDA forecasts for livestock prices in the 
third quarter of 1979 all fell. The forecast price for fed cattle fell from $70.00 per 
hundred pounds to $65.88 (down 6 percent), for hogs from $46.00 to $38.50 (down 16 per-
cent), and for broilers from 48 cents per pound (9-city wholesale) to 41 cents (down 
15 percent). Yet the estimates of total meat production for the third quarter of 1979 
were essentially unchanged. 
Both a priori reasoning and empirical work indicate that a rise in farm input 
prices, such as induced by energy price increases, tends to make producers of farm pro-
ducts worse off. When input prices rise, so long as demand is not perfectly inelastic 
or supply perfectly elastic (neither of which is the case), producer surplus decreases. 
The results from the postwar data given above suggest that periods of general inflation 
have not tended to coincide with periods of increase in the relative costs of producing 
fa~ products. The results do not imply that real cost increases are harmless to farm 
products. And there is good reason for farmers to be concerned about the outlook for 
inflation in farm costs as a result of real (as opposed to monetary) factors in nature, 
the international energy or resource markets, or domestic governmental activity. 
So far we have left out entirely a final reason why those involved in agriculture 
have good reason for concern at the present time. This is the y.l;jP,,~~.~_~~.~r.?-.tedCiegl:'ee . of 
r~.s.k, .and the new and unfamiliar sources of .:risk,that exis.tJl:l .. t09~yl .. ~ iri£.1~fi6n:ar:t "· 
environment. . .. . . 
Consider the following situation. Mr. A wants to purchase 2.00 . acre$ of farmland 
for $1500 an acre. Having equity of $.lOlL.QOO .inlan9" he can borrow the $300,000 needed 
for the purchase, paying a 9 pe.rcent interest rate '~ 2 So Mr. A after the purchase has 
assets of $400,00.0 with $300,000 debt to go with his $lQQ.,.Q..QQ . . total equ~~y. Mr. AI s 
income statement for this land will look something like this: the $400,000 in land 
yields an income flow at the l~ng-term rate of about 3p.E?rq<=nt, i.e., $1~J..OOO per year. 
The $300,000 in debt costs about $ .~ .. 7.,.Q.OO_.iIlint$.tes!: l?~ym.ents. ''' ' .... . --...,~ 
The $12,000 pertains only to the first year. After that, it will increase with 
the rate of inflation. (Any change in the relative or real rental value of land is 
left out of account; the purpose here is to focus on the problem of a general rise in 
the price level.) The fact that Mr. A pays a 9 p§~cent. in:tere~t . J:'c:t.!:(3 to buy an asset 
which yields current returns of .3" .. _p~+.cent indicates his expectation that the asset will 
yield price gains of at least 6 percent. Since the §l..~.~_J:~.r presumably had the option to 
sell to others or retain the asset, there must be expectations that price gains will be 
at most 6 percent. Generally, it is not a bad approximation to suppose tha.t the 
difference between the nominal rate of interest paid and the curr.e.nt .. .1;C3,t.t?qf .. return is 
the marketls estimate of the rate of future price increase, in this case 6 percent. 
Suppose that expectations are realized, and prices rise 6 percent each year. How 
will Mr. A's investment turn out? First, the value of the land over the period of the 
loan is the discounted. vaJ,.ue of the future income flow plus1:he . dis~ounted value of the 
~and at the end of the period: ..... ..... . . 
Rl R2 Rn Vn 
V 0 = Ro + (1 + ~ ) + (1 + i) 2 + ••. + (1 + i) n + (~l""";;+~i-.)-nn 
Where Vo is the initial value of the land, the R's .~.:r:-~ ... :t;.h.~ __ .c:IJ:r;:~.ent .;iIlcome flows in each 
period, i is the discount rate, and V is the value of land at th,e , end of the ' period, n ...... . - .. ,. . -."y§a~ n. Inserting the values from the Mr. A ex~mple, we have: 
$12,000 (1.06) $12,000 (1.06)2 + $400,000 $12,000 + + ... 
1.09 (1.09)2 
$12,000 (1.06)n 
+ 
V 
n 
+ 
(1.09)n (1.09)n 
2The illustrative figure may be out of date by the time this is printed. 
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If expectations are realized, in year one the set of calculations will be the same as 
in the initial year except that we start from $12,000 x (1.06). The whole series is 
increased by 6 percent. Thus, the value of the land is increased by 6 percent, or 
$24,000. 
are: 
Pulling together the preceding calculations, Mr. A's results for the initial year 
Current income from land 
Increase in value of land 
Interest cost 
Total return 
$12,000 
24,000 
27,000 
$ 9,000 
The $9,000 is a 9 percent return on Mr. A's $100,000 equity -- he earns the market 
rate of interest. 
The first problem that becomes apparent in this example is a cash flow problem. 
Since the $24,000 is unrealized, the net realized return is -$15,000. If Mr. A attempts 
to repay some of the principal on his loan, the cash flow deficit is even larger. Be-
cause of the cash flow deficit, Mr. A must either increase his borrowing on the basis 
of the nominal wealth gain or else increase his equity by use of labor income or other 
income sources. 
Now compare an identical investment by Mr. A in the absence of inflation. The 
interest rate would be 3 percent, there would be no wealth gain, and the return would 
be $12,000 - $9,000 = $3,000, a 3 percent rate of return on $100,000 of equity. Again, 
the net rate of return equals the interest rate, but the cash flow problem does not 
arise. Thus, inflation creates real difficulties for the expansion or acquisition of 
farm enterprises by those who rely on debt finance, mainly young farmers. 
Besides the cash flow problem, another consequence of inflation is that Mr. A is 
operating in a very risky environment. Over and above the usual commodity price and 
production risks, a change in the general rate of inflation can affect these results 
greatly. If inflation should accelerate, the land price gains will be greater, and the 
9 percent loan will turn out to be a greater bargain. But suppose that our .E.Qy_~+.nm.en.t" , . 
does indeed bite the bullet and bring inflation down, then the increases in land prices, 
as other prices, will tend to decelerate. The interest costs will not. The resulting 
~ net losses can easily be large. 
~,3.:::..t~:gn .... ~.:g.j::~.:r;.~§.t;. ". ;J;'.s .t.~,~ will not ~.~.~ __ g..2~~~;rd until the mc.1J:'J<:e,ts .. a:r.~ , .. S~I1vinced 
that_~,~§:._".~9}lg::.t.erm_"rate-.. o ·f···" i ·nf latian.,.has ., Q.eclipgd • When i!:l ter~.§, :t:. , .;:.~.~~ s 0 11 mortg.i:lge s finally fall, the losses could sometimes be cut short by re'financing debt 'at the lower 
interest rates. Nonetheless, there is a real risk of substantial, even crippling, 
. losses to lJ;:t'Sl~j;;l._g.ed.."lanq.Q~!!,~t:.~. when the . J;9::!;~~ .. _~~ ... ~H,,~J~:!;,:!-g,,:n: , ",J ,e_ .. ,;r..: ,§!.Q1J.9~d. This is not 
surprising. Instability in the inflation rate ' ls not a free lunch; if leveraged land-
holders make extraordinary gains when inflation accelerates, we should expect a 
corresponding opportunity for losses. 
The overall result is an extraordinary element of risk imposed by an inflationary 
environment. Farmers, like the rest of us, simply have no way of forecasting whether 
inflation will accelerate or decelerate in the years immediately ahead. But the economic 
uncertainty they face in this environment is much greater than for most of us. This 
cost of inflation perhaps impinges most seriously on the farm sector as compared to 
other sectors. 
I emphasize the extreme uncertainty of our knowledge about inflation and agricul-
ture. Instead of a summary of results, I have a list of research questions and issues. 
1. How is general inflation transmitted to agricultural prices? Is there 
a general tendency for input prices to rise before output prices, or 
vice versa, or is it sometimes one way and sometimes the other, or do 
all prices tend to rise simultaneously? 
2. Effects of inflation on agriculture: 
a. Cash-flow problem under high nominal interest rates. 
b. Risk of losses if rate of inflation falls. 
c. Capital flows into and out of agriculture. 
d. Land market. 
e. Tax aspects of capital and inventory accounting. 
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3. Farm management tools for dealing with inflation and related risks: 
a. Contracts with variable interest rates. 
b. Interest-rate futures. 
c. Investment in financial-market information. 
4. Effects on trade through exchange-rate adjustments 
in fixed- and floatinq-rate reg1mes.) • (Mechanism different 
Concluding Comments 
I conclude with a thought on the role of a conference such as this one. Such an 
activity can be extremely valuable, especially when associated with further extension 
efforts. The reason is not that the complex issues concerning inflation are resolved. 
The important point is that the issues are being treated dispassionately and rationally. 
In anthropology it is said that in some tribes people kept their name a secret. For 
ordinary purposes, one would use a pseudo-name. The idea is that if an enemy knew your 
real name he could acquire real power over you, perhaps even the power to call your 
soul out of your body. 
The public policy problem with inflation is largely this: we don't know its real 
name. We find it out by activities such as this conference. 
AN EXTENSION ECONOMIST'S VIEW 
Clay R. Moore 
Extension Economist 
University of Arkansas 
T. K. Warley, a British-Canadian economist, defines an Assistant Professor as one 
who can take an idea and extend it into a lecture, an Associate Professor as one who can 
take an idea and extend it into a course, and a Full Professor as one who can take an 
idea and extend it into a career. A Dean is someone who had forgotten the idea and a 
University President doubted that there ever was an idea. 
I don't know what career prospects attend ideas on the dreary subject of inflation. 
At this seminar both speakers and audience have offered a remarkable degree of consensus. 
Inflation is a dilemma. It is somewhat like sin, in principle bad but in practice some-
times fairly good. There is selective inflation, the kind that benefits me. We all get 
a little inner glow when the fixed assets we own are worth more today than yesterday. 
Even in the 1960s some of us had the experience of buying a house and seeing its value 
rise $5,000 within months. 
Further to recapitulate ideas expressed here, there is consensus that inflation 
cannot be hinged on a single source. It is a multi-faceted thing, it interacts. Some 
things are a part of the cause but do not focus. There has been general agreement about 
investments that only exploit inflation and contribute no social product. Professor 
Schilling said he bought gold and hated himself for doing so, but speculative gains and 
tax exemptions were attractive. As an aside I whispered to someone, "Why don't we limit 
capital gains treatment to investments in the economic sense -- productive investments?" 
I had in mind new plants and equipment and not just transfer of fixed assets. Capital 
gains treatment might well be restricted to entrepreneurial risk taking ventures. 
Also agreed on is the harsh reality of mjusting to a less affluent lifestyle. 
Energy has passed its Golden Age, and during those years we were lulled into a sense of 
complacency about the material components of our level of living. 
Ending of cheap energy means a drop in real income. How is that drop to be achieved? 
I recently heard a news reporter remind that the energy crisis came on several years ago. 
When Gerald Ford was President there was active consideration of whether or not to de-
control prices of fuel, and Congress told President Ford that he would not be overridden 
if he were serious about decontrolling gas and oil. But the political considerations 
caused him not to take the step. 
Howard Hjort, principal economist in ,the U. S. Department of Agriculture, defends the 
present USDA attention to structure of agriculture in spite of pressure to concentrate 
on feed grain exports, consumer reactions to food prices, and such. He says, though, 
that it is discouraging to try to get the House Ways and Means Committee to deal with 
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the subject of taxes as they affect farmers' entry into agriculture and similar matters 
affecting structure. Not enough citizens are pressing for Congressional action on dif-
ficult economic questions. I want to make the point that lack of enthusiasm of political 
leaders to address the hard questions, questions that include inflation, is a major ob-
stacle. I wonder where the giants are, the Norrises and the Borahs and the Douglases 
and, begging pardon for bragging on a man from Arkansas, former Senator Fulbright? Where 
are the giants who pursue a public issue doggedly, either winning or losing but gaining 
stature even in losing? 
An article I read recently in the Wall Street Journal was titled, "Keep It Simple." 
People want to hear the most complicated subject d~scussed in 10 or 15 minutes. Political 
commentators, many of whom may be wrong but never in doubt, conform to the keep-it-simple 
rule and are careful to leave time for the commercial. 
What I am saying is that inflation control is partly a matter of political science. 
Let's face the fact that if we as a society are going to control inflation we have to do 
it through the process of government. It's not just the President and Executive Branch 
but also -- perhaps more -- the elected representatives. But we all as a society must 
ask the perplexing question of whether we can learn the harsh lessons of inflation in 
any way other than a crash. 
Professor Schilling, when asked whether he were an optimist or a pessimist replied, 
"I'm a pessimist." He related the experience of post-World-War I Germany. And although 
we are not in danger of repeating that debacle I read recently an article pointing out 
that present-day Germany almost has it both ways. It has something close to a welfare 
state, with national health insurance, free university education, adequate welfare, 
clean environment, and strong unions. It also has a healthy, productive, competitive 
economy, with low inflation, and a strong currency. The percapita income in Germany of 
$8,410 in 1977 almost matched the $8,670 of the U. S. Germany's economy is more stable, 
productive and non-inflationary than ours even though government expenditures are 41.3 
percent of GNP as opposed to 36.2 percent in the United States. 
There are explanations for Germany's ability to afford a social democracy and be 
productive too. Probably the most important single factor is that its people and its 
government regard inflation as a danger worse than anything except war. They know the 
ill effects that inflation can cause. Germany's social democracy is advanced more than 
ours but the management of its economy is more conservative. Germany hasn't rejected 
Keynesian economics. The government intervenes in the economy to counteract the business 
cycle. In slow-growth times it cuts taxes, spends on public works, and goes into budget 
deficit, just as we have done. But unlike ours the German government reverses course 
when times are good. In Germany in 1979 Chancellor Schmidt has run a budget surplus in 
order to reduce the public debts accumulated in deficit years that followed the mid-70s' 
recession and also in order to check inflation. In the United States we have chosen to 
honor Keynes only in expansionary times and to ignore him when there is full employment 
and a chance to raise taxes and reduce the budget. Further with regard to the German 
experience, besides an anti-inflation, pro-investment, and pro-productivity psychology 
there is labor union restraint. Germany's labor and management see themselves as social 
partners. The author of the article I am quoting does not imply that Germany is all good 
and we're all bad. But the gist is that the U. S. experience has been conditioned by 
the depths of the depression and ways of reviving the economy. 
Until recently we haven't had the experience of chronic inflation. This is now 
our most perplexing economic question. My concluding question is the same as asked by 
other speakers at this seminar: can we learn the harsh lessons of inflation in any way 
other than by a crash? 
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ENERGY RESOURCES AND INFLATION* 
Doug las R. Bohi 
Resources for the Future, Inc. 
The topic for this session is resources and inflation. It is a very broad topic 
with many stories to tell. I will limit my remarks to energy resources. This alone is 
a broad topic with many stories to tell. 
Everyone is of course aware that rising energy prices account for a large share of 
our current inflationary problem. Each month as the government issues its cost-of-livlng 
figures, fuel prices lead the list. And when fuel prices rise, we are aware of the pres-
sure on the prices of all other goods and services that have an energy component. This 
is the most "v isible" contribution of energy prices to overall inflation. 
Another visible effect works through the balance of payments. As world oil prices 
rise, total spending on oil imports increases because of the lack of flexibility, in the 
short run at least, to reduce consumption. The increased flow of dollars into foreign 
exchange markets has a depressing effect on the exchange value of the dollar, making all 
imported goods more expensive in the united States. 
As important as these visible effects may be, I would like to emphasize a more sub-
tle influence that works through the overall performance of the economy. The possible 
impact of rising energy prices on future economic growth and productivity is not well 
understood. The effect could take some time to become apparent, but may be long lasting 
and pervasive and the adverse results could be more important than the direct, visible 
contribution to inflation that we are now experiencing. 
The direct and immediate effect of higher energy prices on the economy can be mea-
sured by the value-added contribution of energy to GNP~ that is, the value of energy 
used to produce all other goods and services. The contribution of energy to the produc-
tion of other goods and services is also a reflection of the resources required to supply 
energy. Rising energy prices not only increase the value of the contribution of energy 
but also cause a redirection in the use of resources from other goods and services toward 
the production or acquisition of energy. This effect is most obvious when the price of 
imported oil rises, because imported oil is ultimately paid for by exporting goods and 
services abroad. The higher the oil price, the more goods must be sold in exchange for 
oil, and the less resources are available to produce goods for domestic consumption. A 
similar effect is also achieved when additional resources are required for domestic 
energy production; the production of other goods and services is reduced because of the 
diversion of resources into the energy sector. The same result holds whether private 
industry uses the resources or whether the government directs their use such as for syn-
thetic fuels production, as President Carter has recently proposed. 
Recent estimates, based on input-output analysis, suggest that energy contributes 
about 7 percent to the total value of GNP. There is some doubt about the accuracy of 
this estimate because existing prices for energy do not reflect their replacement costs. 
Price controls on oil and natural gas cause an undervaluation of their contribution and 
require an adjustment in the value of these resources above their going prices. And if 
oil and gas are undervalued, all other domestic energy resources will be undervalued, 
too, as they are all interrelated. In addition, because energy prices have been in-
creasing so rapidly in recent months, any current estimate based on past data will be 
out-of-date. But, assuming a 7 percent figure is about right, and assuming everyone con-
tinues to use the same amount of energy, a doubling of energy costs would cause a diver-
sion of 7 percent of GNP to pay for the increased cost of energy. This cost estimate 
doesn't sound too large until it is multiplied by the total value of GNP; a cost of 
$150 billion per year sounds more impressive. 
This level of a cost estimate is often considered a maximum because after the price 
increase, consumers will not continue to use the same amount of energy as before. In 
particular, producers will naturally try to substitute other factors of production when 
the relative cost of energy rises and this will reduce the impact of energy prices on the 
economy. Incidentally, these. calculations are also used to measure the maximum impact 
of energy price increases on inflation. If energy constitutes 7 percent of the value of 
GNP, doubling energy prices will at most increase the prices of all goods and services 
by 7 percent. ' All prices will not rise at the same rate, however, as those embodying 
* The views expressed here are those of the author alone and should not be attributed to 
Resources for the Future. 
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more energy will rise faster. The change in relative prices will cause consumers to re-
direct their purchases away from these goods and the overall inflationary effect will be 
reduced from the maximum possible. 
But this sUbstitution process, while it will reduce the immediate burden on GNP and 
inflation, has unknown and possibly adverse implications for future growth of GNP as well 
as for future rates of inflation. 
By substitution for energy, I mean an increase in the proportion of labor and capit~ 
relative to the use of energy in production. Increased use of labor is straightforward; 
production ' processes will become more labor intensive but not to the extent to conjure 
images of a return to the toil and drudgery of a preindustrial era. Substitution of cap-
ital means the replacement of existing equipment with more energy-efficient alternatives. 
Engineers tell us there is considerable room for improvement with available technology; 
we can expect adoption as energy costs rise. 
The question is what will happen to economic growth and labor productivity when 
labor and capital are sUbstituted for energy. Looking back through history one can see 
that the great economic advances of the past century are directly related to increased 
use of energy in production. What is especially notable is the mutual development of 
alternative forms of cheap energy and of the technical means to take advantage of new, 
cheap energy sources. A few examples will illustrate. 
As late as 1870 the United States was three-quarters dependent on wood for fuel. 
Wood was becoming scarce and it was limited to providing fairly low-level heat. The trans-
ition to cheaper coal not only removed an energy supply constraint but also encouraged 
development of large-scale iron and steel production, and all of the products required 
for an industrial economy, including the most important at the time, the railroad system 
that spanned the country. In the 20th century, energy supply shifted toward petroleum 
and electricity. Again, both were cheap and plentiful. Increased use of electric motors 
permitted the reorganization of factory production and removed many inefficiencies and 
limitations of earlier mechanical systems. The contribution of petroleum to agricultural 
productivity, through tractors, fertilizers, and pesticides, is representative of its 
contribution to productivity elsewhere in the economy. 
It may be said that cheap energy, and the development of technology to put it to 
use, removed constraints on the productivity of labor and permitted rapid growth in the 
production of goods and services. Now the question is what happens when the process is 
reversed, when energy itself becomes a constraint rather than a constraint-breaker, and 
production processes must become less energy-intensive. 
Unfortunately, nobody knows the answer. It ultimately depends on the development 
of technology that is both energy saving and labor using but still makes possible an in-
crease in labor productivity. 
Prospects for the near-term are not encouraging. We have just left an era of cheap 
-- in fact, falling -- real energy prices, and under those circumstances there has been 
little motivation to develop energy-saving technology. But even where more efficient 
technology is available, the process of adopting it is slow and costly. Many firms are 
locked into existing capital structures and are unable to scrap them as energy prices 
rise. The cost of replacing equipment must be balanced against the added fuel costs of 
using existing equipment. If the cost advantage isn't there, firms must try to pass on 
higher fuel costs in their product prices, which in turn may be expected to reduce sales. 
In this way, higher energy costs force a reduction in the rate of utilization of in-
efficient equipment, and also in this indirect way force energy savings. 
It takes time to replace the existing stock of plant and equipment and, in some 
cases, replacement will have to wait for new technology. It might be expected, there-
fore, that for some time to come business will be more inclined to add labor whenever 
possible, in effect substituting labor for both energy and capital. This has the happy 
result of increasing employment prospects in our economy, but the potentially unhappy 
result of reducing labor productivity. If the so-called law of diminishing returns can-
not be broken, then adding more labor to the existing capital base will inevitably re-
duce labor productivity. What evidence we have on this score, including that of the 
last couple of years, suggests that this is indeed the case. 
Real wages of labor are intimately linked to labor productivity, and not just be-
cause labor unions use productivity indexes to guide their wage demands. Rising produc-
tivity enables business to grant wage increases without equal increases in product prices. 
When productivity falls, wage increases must be met with even higher price increases, 
meaning that inflation will exceed the growth of wages and real incomes must fall. If 
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wage earners try to catch up with prices by further wage demands the only outcome is an 
inflationary spiral. 
For the economy as a whole, increasing productivity is the source of the economic 
dividend that permits a general improvement in the standard of living. Without it, the 
quality of life, as we usually measure it, must fall. 
These events describe what has been happening in the U. S. economy in the last few 
years. Plant and equipment spending has stagnated, and so has GNP, but unemployment has 
not increased as one would normally expect under these conditions -- in fact, it has 
fallen. Productivity measures have declined, wages have not kept pace with inflation, 
and real incomes have fallen. 
These dismal results may be only transitory. Prospects for the future will be 
brighter only if technology is developed that will permit advances in productivity. The 
emphasis these days seems to be on new technology to produce energy -- to develop new 
energy sources in order to slow the growth of energy costs. If this effort doesn't 
succeed, or if it only succeeds in giving us even higher-cost domestic energy to replace 
high-cost foreign oil, it will still be just as important to develop improved technology 
for the use of energy. Either we achieve technical success in the production or con-
sumption of energy or we must learn to live with less of everything, as some observers 
are now suggesting to be necessary if not inevitable. 
What are some policy implications that may be drawn from these concerns? To me the 
most crucial policy implication is that price controls on energy products should be ended 
-- that the present plan to gradually end price controls on oil and natural gas should be 
allowed to proceed unimpeded, and that cost increases should be transmitted to final 
consumers. 
This conclusion may seem to be inconsistent with the concern over the effect of 
rising energy prices on the economy. It is not inconsistent, however, if rising prices 
are viewed as a manifestation of underlying economic realities, in which case rising 
prices are not the problem, but rather are a reflection of more basic problems, and that 
rising prices can function as part of the solution. 
Let me try to explain. First, if price controls also mean that demand will continue 
to exceed supplies, then the shortages will mean that businesses will still face the same 
problems as they would with increasing prices. That is, they will still have to sub-
stitute away from energy. 
Second, price controls may actually be counterproductive to the sUbstitution problem. 
If price controls mean that less energy will be available, the need for substitution 
away frqm energy will be greater than necessary. Price controls will be harmful also 
because government rationing schemes cannot ensure that available supplies will go to 
their most productive uses. A great advantage of the price system is that a more ef-
ficient allocation will be made through price changes. The most productive uses are 
also those most able to pay higher prices, as they are able to bid supplies away from 
less productive uses. This has a negative side too. It means less energy consumption 
by households, and that available supplies will go to the wealthier consumers, thus 
raising the difficult issue of an equitable distribution of supplies among consumers. 
The equity problem must be addressed, but preferably in a way that doesn't also sacri-
fice efficiency. 
Price controls are also undesirable because they reduce or delay the process of 
developing new, energy-efficient technology. Need is sometimes referred to as the mother 
of invention and rising prices are the market's way of signalling that need. They provide 
the economic incentive to search for cheaper and better alternatives. 
It is important that private interests become geared to developing new technology, 
for it is unlikely that government can give much direct help. While it is feasible (and 
essential) for the government to become directly involved in the development of energy-
producing technology, it is not so feasible on the energy-consuming side. There are 
simply too many applications, each requiring specific expertise, for the government to 
be useful. Thus, private interests must be motivated to do so, and in my view price is 
the most direct way of providing that motivation. 
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COOPERATIVES AND INFLATION 
W. Gordon Leith 
Corporate Vice President, Farmland Indust~ies 
Inflation is the subject of a steady barrage of newspaper articles, magazine articles, 
television programs. Yet there is some frustration. Harold Breimyer, usually a stimula-
ting writer, in the opening paper about "What inflation is and does" reveals a ~ertain 
tiredness. He too exhibits a considerable degree of frustration when he admits that when 
dealing with the subject of inflation, flacademic economists are experiencing their worst 
credibility crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s." He goes on to say, "Econo-
mists have won few laurels in either interpreting or correcting our present problem. 1I 
I also point out that attitudes and opinions about the severity of the inflation 
problem change rapidly when the possible alternatives are contemplated. We have seen in 
October the firm stand by the Federal Reserve Board under Chairman Volcker to tighten up 
the money supply as a firm policy to reduce the rate of inflation. We have seen the re-
action of the stock market and the reaction regarding interest rates. Now some counter-
reaction is setting in on the part of some persons who appear unwilling to make the 
possible sacrifices of recession, unemployment, and a slump in the housing market to 
beat inflation. When they discover that they may not be able to have their cake and 
eat it too, they begin to get cold feet about fighting inflation. 
Most of the speakers at this seminar have identified one or more economic benefici-
aries or losers from inflation. The gainers or losers may be groups of individuals, in-
dustries, economic sectors, and/or geographic regions. The gainers and losers are ident-
ified on the basis of relative price changes. Rapid rates of inflation, as those we 
have recently been experiencing, substantially enlarge the magnitude of differences in 
relative price changes. There are many ]arge gainers and many large losers. 
This differential in relative rates of price change is well known to agricultural 
producers. It is more commonly known to us as the IIcost-price squeeze." During periods 
of rapid general inflation, the cost-price squeeze typically becomes more severe for 
agriculture, since the price of farm inputs is closely tied to other sectors in the 
economy. 
I confine my remarks to areas and subjects in which I have some degree of expertise. 
I respond as a businessman, and in addition, as an official of a cooperative organization. 
I make no claims of objectivity. I am pro-farmer, pro-agriculture, and pro-cooperative. 
The main thrust of my discussion will be the effect of inflation on farmers, and 
the role of cooperatives in fighting inflation. I will generalize somewhat in my con-
cluding remarks. 
Regarding agriculture, the effect of inflation is a combination of pluses and 
minuses. The effect on land prices, of course, is very noticeable. Land is a non-renew-
able and non-depreciable resource. The relative rate of increase in land price over the 
past decade has been extremely high. Farmers have bid up the price of land as they 
attempt to increase their scale of operations, and holders of wealth seeking investment 
in land have also been bidders. Existing owners of land, of course, have been the major 
beneficiaries of inflation. We have all read reports of "paper" millionaires among 
farmers. On a net basis the owners of farms have been gainers during periods of net in-
flation. 
The purchase of land by non-farmers causes concern for the structural make-up of 
agriculture, with erosion of family farm ownership. 
Inflation, of course, has a devastating effect on farmers regarding purchased in-
puts and production necessities. Rising interest costs, rising labor costs, and rising 
input costs all adversely affect farmers. 
Crude oil is a perfect example. Crude oil prices are now administered rather than 
being determined by market forces, and farmers are large users of petroleum. 
About 65% of the cost of food is added in the marketing channel beyond the farm. 
As in the case of supply firms, we see increased concentration of marketing firms. We 
note with concern the acquisition by R. J. Reynolds of Del Monte; the acquisition by 
Pillsbury of Green Giant; the acquisition by Cargill of MPBXL, the large meat packing 
plant. 
In the farm supply field, agricultural supply firms are growing larger and stronger 
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and this trend will probably continue in the future. This means that it is easier for 
large firms to pass on costs to the consumer. 
On the marketing side of agriculture, we have seen costs increase throughout the mar-
keting channels. During periods of high inflation, food becomes a major target of con-
sumers l frustration. 
Food prices have historically increased at a rate relatively slower than other prices. 
Consumers have slowly reduced the percentage of their total expenditures spent on food. 
This has combatted some of the effects of inflation as far as the consumer is concerned, 
and has resulted from the substantial gains in productivity of agriculture, plus agri-
culturels propensity to over-produce. 
A contributing factor is the trend toward foodls acquiring more frills, packaging, 
and convenience as it goes through the marketing channel. The percentage of agricultural 
products in the food dollar tends to go down, and inflation rates in the future can be 
more noticeable because of this. 
Another effect of inflation on agriculture is that the high rate of inflation in 
the U. S. relative to the rest of the world results in a devaluation of the dollar which 
tends to increase U. S. exports, primarily of agricultural products. The agricultural 
sector in this sense benefits from the U. S. inflation. 
Therefore, we see pluses and minuses in agriculture from inflation. 
Inflation, of course, affects business firms in many, many ways. For instance, 
about two weeks ago we held a meeting of the trustees of our retirement plan. Our retire-
ment plan serves not only employees of Farmland Industries, but also employees of some 
900-plus local cooperatives who are part of the plan. A total of 19,000 employees are 
covered. Total assets of the plan today are in the neighborhood of $150 million. 
When functioning as a trustee of this plan, with a definite fiduciary relationship 
as defined by law, the problem of inflation becomes very real. First, it becomes one of 
how to invest sums of this magnitude to maximize returns to the plan under the dynamic 
economic conditions, and of course, inflationary economic conditions. One of the first 
decisions is investing in stocks versus bonds, versus other avenues such as real properties. 
Another matter of very great concern is the devastating effect of inflation on re-
tired persons on fixed incomes. As we so well know, every percentage increase in infla-
tion is a similar percentage decrease in standard of living of persons on a fixed income. 
Facing a constantly decreasing standard of living is not a happy prospect for people in 
their retirement years. 
This, of course, is just one effect of inflation on business organizations. There 
are a host of problems on the operating side of the business -- decisions about wage and 
salary increases, decisions relating to increasing prices in light of increasing costs, 
decisions about wage rates and union contracts, decisions about the cost of carrying in-
ventories and receivables, decisions relating to long range planning and assumptions that 
should be made regarding inflation. This is very real. Right now in Farmland we are in 
a long range planning period for the next five years beginning September 1, 1980. 
Some of the key decisions incorporating inflation assumptions are projections of 
petroleum prices, projections of fertilizer prices, projections of operating costs. 
Petroleum prices have an enormous impact on farmland as they do on the entire nation. 
Petroleum prices in the U. S. and the rest of the world are a function of crude oil 
prices. In recent years, crude oil prices have moved from a position where market forces 
were a key influencing factor to a position in which they are mandated by the OPEC car-
tel. Economic conditions (declining world reserves; a concentration of reserves among 
a few nations many of which have low population levels; a rapidly growing, highly in-
elastic demand; and undeveloped, expensive substitutes) provide ample incentive to the 
OPEC countries to continue to increase prices at a rapid rate. It currently appears 
that the OPEC countries will increase crude oil prices at an average rate of about 15 
percent annually. This will have an immense impact on all energy prices and all products 
and services dependent upon energy. Our current forecast for natural gas prices is 
$10.19/MCF in 1990. This converts into a production cost of $532/ton for anhydrous am-
monia in 1990. The implications for the agricultural sector are, therefore, alarming. 
Many of our lines of business are cyclical in nature, so a business does not auto-
matically see an appreciation of assets or appreciation of inventories when general in-
flation is occurring. We are in the meat business, for instance, so are subject to the 
cattle and hog cycles. There are cycles in the fertilizer business too. 
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Let's look at cooperatives as inflation fighters. Obviously, the two main effects 
or should I say the two main weapons -- are first, competition, and secondly, patron-
age refunds. 
Because of the competitive effect of cooperatives, there is no question in my mind 
that the results not only are good for farmers, but some of them are passed on to con-
sumers as well. Empirical evidence suggests there is less inflation in industries where 
there is cooperative competition, such as the feed business or the fertilizer business, 
compared with the farm machinery business where ther~ is no cooperative competition. 
Regarding refunds, in its 50-year life Farmland Industries has produced savings of 
about $900 million. Half of this has gone back to local cooperatives, and in various 
ways through the locals to farmers; and the other half is invested in facilities and 
working capital. This is $900 million that would not have helped farmers had Farmland 
not been a cooperative organization. The deep significance of this is hard to grasp, 
but it is real. 
Our refunds, of course, vary from year to year. In 1975 when fertilizer margins 
were very wide, Farmland Industries paid a patronage refund on fertilizer at the whole-
sale level amounting to $51.61 a ton, which is a refund of 35 percent. Something of this 
nature is almost unheard of. 
This is an excellent example, however, of how a cooperative negates the effect of 
inflation in a specific product line on the customers of that product. Market conditions 
created a rapid run-up of fertilizer prices compared to costs of production. This dif-
ference in price increase was returned to the cooperative patrons in the form of patron-
age refunds. The cooperative customers were, therefore, protected from the inflationary 
escalation in fertilizer prices. 
For the year just ended on August 31, 1979, our refund averaged 3.4 percent. Over 
the past decade our refund on farm supplies has averaged 5.9 percent on an unweighted 
basis. In the case of our meat operation, for the fiscal year just ended our refund on 
hogs amounted to $4.69 average per hog. On cattle the refund was $4.92 per head. 
Here again, these are real figures -- actual experiences -- and they reflect the 
effect of cooperatives in combating the ravages of inflation. Also our refund is com-
bined with local savings to reflect the refund to farmers. 
The Need for Economic Education 
In a talk I made in Edmonton, Canada, last June I spoke of the need for economic . 
education. Actually, the level of economic education appears to be appallingly low on 
the part of many people. This has a definite bearing on understanding inflation and the 
need to do something about it. It is true, also, in agriculture. We see the desire for 
simplistic solutions, legislating high prices to farmers, and other seemingly quick and 
painless solutions to basic and deep economic problems. A recent article in the Kansas 
City Star on October 21 dealt with the same problem. In the article James W. Kirk-
patrick, II, stated, "Although Americans are lightyears ahead of many other cultures in 
terms of political maturity, we nonetheless are still primitive when it comes to under-
standing economics." 
Mr. Kirkpatr ick went on to say, II I f a maj or ity of our people do not fully under stand 
even fundamental economic principles and issues, then we cannot hope that suitable leaders 
will be chosen who will shape necessary economic policy. II 
We all have a role to increase economic understanding, and I say not only a role, 
but a challenge and a need. 
While I am giving out free advice, I would also challenge our academic friends to 
come to grips with the significant differences between a cooperative and other businesses 
serving farmers. Too often there is a tendency on the part of academicians to brush off 
cooperatives as just another business. This is not true. They are uniquely structured 
and uniquely operated to serve farmers. This has many results, including that of fight-
ing inf lat ion. 
There is need to tackle some of the really rough questions facing agriculture. One 
example is research in the input area, but I would add studies of the structure of agri-
cultural production, the competitive situation, cost and efficiencies, the effect of 
economic power, and how all this affects the farmer. 
In the overall U. S. economy, we are viewing increasing concern about the slowdown 
in our rate of growth of productivity. We are reading more and more about the need for 
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capital formation as a part of the producti~ity problem .. We ~eed to addre~s these matters 
continuously especially as they relate to agr~culture,and ~n th~s the acade~c community 
has an important role to play. 
I would urge, too, an examination of the entir~ matt~r of flexibility, of prices 
and margins, in labor, in industry, and also in agr~culture. 
REFLECTIONS: WHERE WE HAVE 
BEEN AND WHERE WE MAY BE GOING 
Everett E. Peterson 
How can we pull together the discussion of the seminar, as reported in these pro-
ceedings? My general impression is that we have been long on definition of the inflation 
problem and discussion of its good and bad effects, but short on solutions. I find my-
self tempted to admit that I am one of the pessimistic persons attending this seminar. 
Economics is said to be the dismal science. We may wonder if Malthus was right as we 
readdress economists' concern over scarcity and begin to understand what economizing 
really means. Allocation of scarce resources among competing ends so as to maximize the 
attainment of those ends is what economics has been about. During the first two hundred 
years of our national life the allocation came easy. It was not hard to maximize our 
satisfactions because we had abundant and low priced resources at hand. The new outlook 
is disturbing. It has been referred to time after time during this conference: resources 
are not so plentiful now. If we don't get anything out of the conference except a better 
understanding of the nature and complexity of the current inflationary period including 
its resource base, it has been very much worthwhile. 
During the next year of election campaigning we will hear single-cause explanations 
of inflation and simple solutions. Government spending will be singled out as the pri-
mary cause. If we balance the federal budget, we can solve the problem! As we heard 
over and over again in this conference, the problem is complex. If this has been truly 
understood we can take credit for improved ability to participate in discussion and to 
influence policy decisions. There is opportunity to exert influence. We sometimes feel 
that what we do, such as to write a letter to our Congressman, doesn't count. But be-
lieve me it does. What other way is there? Otherwise we just sit back and say, "Well, 
we're going to let the big boys do it. Nobody will listen to us, so why bother?" Such 
an attitude is not merely passive but aggravates the inflation problem. 
I borrow from Sheldon Stahl the components of the current prevalent attitude: 
ignorance, apathy, self-interest, and greed. These bear on our ability to deal effec-
tively with inflation. I will touch on them later. 
Comments on Presentations 
I now comment briefly on some of the things said during the conference. Harold 
Breimyer gave us a good definition of inflation; he listed its effects in terms of who 
wins and who loses; and he presented a rather pessimistic outlook. 
Professor Kuhlman told us (and I concur) that we have moved away from the compet-
itive economy to which lip service is still paid. Oil companies advertise how compet-
itive they are, how deregulation will bring more oil. I ask, "What if there isn't any 
more oil?" Granted, Mexico, the tarsands of Canada, or Colorado's oil shale may provide 
us a respite. But the cost will be sky-high. In any case, Kuhlman pointed out that we 
have moved a long way toward "economic elephants." When an elephant OPEC or Chrysler 
changes positions it rocks the boat severely. Or as former Secretary of Agriculture 
Earl Butz once said regarding OPEC, "The sheiks give us the economic shakes." 
Kuhlman's solution is to restore competition as the way out -- break up the elephants, 
cut them up into pieces. As an economist I am inclined to agree; Adam Smith's in-
visible hand is attractive. But this is politically impossible. It is too late. We 
are going to have to live with the system we already have. 
With respect to the international implications of inflation, the important thing to 
realize is that it's not a U. S. phenomenon. It is world wide. It will continue to be 
world wide for a long time to come. The U. S. is very important in the picture because 
of our gluttonous demand for the world's increasingly scarce resources, our reliance upon 
imported petroleum, the resulting weakness of the dollar, and the realization that 
economic theory doesn't help very much. 
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Supposedly our imbalance of trade will right itself but too many governments won't 
let it happen. The European Economic Community, for example, restricts imports of 
agricultural products. We have protested for 20 years, without major positive results. 
We also realize that the elephants in our economy don't respond as our economic 
theory tells us they should. When the value of our dollar went down and the prices of 
imports went up American consumers should have shifted from Toyotas to Plymouths. What 
did our auto manufacturers do to meet this foreign competition? They raised their prices. 
Surely the automobile industry can produce automobiles as dependable and economical as 
the Toyotas and others. Mistakes have been made by these elephants but the consumer and 
the government are supposed to bail them out. 
Schilling and others insisted that the age of cheap ~nergy is over and will not come 
back. How long a transition? Very long, the speakers said. People of my age are talk-
ing about the good old days of abundant low cost resources and goods. This alone carries 
a message. Some will argue that material comforts do not define a good life. Perhaps; 
but we deplore losing them. We hear wailing from all sides, especially when the price of 
gasoline goes up. 
Sheldon Stahl told us government's monetary and fiscal policy can either add to in-
flation or might possibly keep it under control. He defended John Maynard Keynes, who 
saw monetary and fiscal policies not only as an escape from depression but as a means 
to keep inflation from getting out of hand. But we haven't entered the second stage be-
cause politics overrides economic considerations. Politicians believe, probably correctly, 
that the majority of voters prefer inflation to recession. Gainers may not outnumber 
losers but they have more political clout. 
Several interest groups represented here -- farmers, laborers, and consumers --
offered their reactions to inflation. Farmers mix fear and frustration. Fear is schizo-
phrenic -- fear that inflation will continue and fear that it will end. Frustrations 
are associated with uncertainty about rising costs arid the growing debt load with cash 
flow problems especially for young farmers. Incidentally, these stresses led to the for-
mation of the American Agriculture Movement. 
The labor view calls attention to the faster increase in the cost of living than 
wages. There is concern over foreign competition and what it is doing to the American 
working population. Mr. McVey expressed a concern over the power of corporations similar 
to Professor Kuhlman's. Organized labor is not to blame for inflation in the cost of 
medical care and even housing, both marked by severe inflation. 
Inflation has differential impacts on various categories of consumers. Basing 
policies on lIaverage" or "normal" households can often be harmful. I add that the same 
distortion prevails in agriculture as aggregate or average data do not fit some classes 
of farmers. Consumers cope by reducing savings. Also, more wives take jobs. Their 
doing so conjures up other problems such as the decline of the family, effects upon the 
children including nutrition and their feeling of insecurity, and the increasing divorce 
rate. 
Consumers, particularly young famili~s, face cash flow problems similar to those of 
farmers. These become critical if the wife loses her job (she is the more likely to be 
laid off). Yet, paradoxically, families are being barraged by advertising and exhortation 
to keep spending -- borrow against the equity in the horne, take that vacation trip, 
buy that new car, put the kids through college. All these increase debt. And many of 
the things people are exhorted to buy are energy inefficient. 
Inflation brings a rise in agriculture's asset values, Professor Gardner pointed 
out, but can also lead to serious cash flow problems. Breimyer later joined in calling 
for more emphasis on the asset value aspect, including implications for financing agri-
culture in the future. Young farm families especially are having trouble getting started. 
But what alternatives ,are available? I don't think agricultural economists who specialize 
in credit have faced up to this issue. We say subchapter S takes care of the first trans-
fer, when there are perhaps two or four heirs, one of whom is the operating heir. The 
others don't necessarily want their money right away so the farm business survives. But 
what happens with the next generation of eight or ten heirs? 
The increase in value of agricultural assets that has benefited the older generation 
so much translates to an equal burden to the younger farmer aspiring to own an operation. 
Is there some other way by which agriculture can be financed? We1re still thinking in 
terms of paying off the debt and achieving full ownership. I think this is an impossible 
dream for many people. If inflation continues, is there a chance of eventual national-
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ization of farmland? Licensing of the right to farm? I don't know the answer but can't 
see continued reliance on traditional methods of agricultural finance and intergener-
ational transfer. 
Dr. Bohi pointed out that energy prices are a major factor contributing to inflation~ 
that no relief is in sight, and that many of us are hoping that technology will come up 
with new sources of energy to restore conditions that existed pre-1973, the 20-year 
Golden Age of cheap energy. Dr. Bohi called for ending price controls, but he ad-
mitted that problems of equity must be faced if that is done. Severe hardships for 
some people cannot be ignored. We have come a long way from the early days of eco-
nomics where it was assumed that loss of a job was bad luck and of no one else's con-
cern. 
Where Have We Been? 
We have just been through the age of cheap energy, a period of economic growth and 
stable prices, 1950-1973. Then came 1973, the oil embargo and since then the upward 
ratcheting of crude oil prices. We're now in the sixth year of a transition period. To 
date we have failed to face up to the kind of a new age into which we are now headed. 
There is some awareness that resources are finite and prices are going to be higher, 
but we keep hoping for a technological fix. And our responses have been based pretty 
much on the four attitudes that I mentioned in the beginning: ignorance, apathy, self 
interest, and greed. I now add a fifth, hope. 
Ignorance. Polled Americans often still say the oil crisis is contrivedj oil 
company profits confirm the judgment. The federal budget deficit is singled out as 
the cause of inflation; individual actions are ignored. 
Apathy. It's a feeling that the problem is so big and complex that there isn't 
anything that one as an individual can do. Why hold speed to 55 miles an hourj no one 
else does? The incentives to conserve aren't there. This attitude leads to looking out 
for IInumber one." This means doing those things we can as individuals or families to 
protect ourselves against the impacts of inflation. Self-interest extended leads to -
Greed. This includes looking for chances to make it big, even though the economy 
is going bust. Examples are the buying and selling of existing assets such as farm-
land and housing to benefit from inflation-caused rises in value. 
But many people also have hope and faith -- hope in the system, hope (and faith) 
that we will be able to corne up with solutions, that leadership will develop, that 
policies will be adopted to reduce uncertainty, restore some measure of stability, and 
enable us to do some planning. 
As I said at the outset, I can't be optimistic. We are headed into a period where 
some serious adjustments are needed. I am not sure we are prepared to make them. 
Where Are We Going? 
We will have continued inflation for the further reason that our economy, as 
former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Arthur Burns insisted, has inflationary biases. 
Some trac~ to our anti-recession policy, designed after the Great Depression of the 
1930s. These have been used with considerable success to moderate business cycles, but 
not to control inflation. A second inflationary bias is that wages and prices are flex-
ible in only one direction -- up. Even when employment is dropping and business in-
ventories are rising, we find that wages and prices do not come down. 
Thirdly, economic decisions, interest rates, contract terms, wage negotiations, 
and pension plans are based upon expectations of continued inflation. 
Fourth is growth obsession, a Chamber of Commerce mentality that still maintains 
that bigger is better, more is good. These things were possible in the years before 
1973 but require some serious rethinking now as to contribution to gross national pro-
ductivity. 
Fifth are programs to protect people from economic hardships. As a result of the 
Great Depression we protect with unemployment benefits, food stamps, and other measures. 
As a retiree I am in the favored position of enjoying a cost-of-living escalator to my 
retirement payments. The Consumer Price Index includes items which I don't buy any more. 
Social Security recipients also get their payments boosted. These protections of in-
come are a contributing factor toward inflation. 
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Sixth are programs to shield business from the rigors of competition -- subsidies, 
price maintenance, import duties and quotas, government loans, and others. Leaders of 
business firms do not like to talk about these protective measures against the rigors of 
competition. 
Seventh is rising government expenditures at all levels. Federal spending is up 
400 percent since 1960, and state and local government 500 percent. Although not the 
sole cause of inflation, it does contribute. 
A major item in federal expenditures is the increase in military expenditure, not 
mentioned at this seminar. Defense expenditures are necessary in an unstable world but 
are an inflationary force, representing demands upon resources competitive with consump-
tion goods. How many times over do we need to be able to kill the Russians? Sixteen 
times? We are now embarking upon a multi-billion dollar program (apparently proposed by 
somebody who loved his toy trains when he was a kid) to build underground railroads to 
shuffle missiles over the western states. Think what the $50 billion, or whatever the 
cost will be, would do to develop mass transit systems to move people instead of missiles! 
possible Inflation Control Policies 
What can we do about inflation? The main issues can be summarized as efficiency 
versus equity and much consideration must be given to equity. Who gains, who loses? It 
is the moral consideration. As pointed out early in this seminar, morality enters into 
deterioration in attitudes toward honesty, work, the family, and integrity in government. 
In a sense morality bears also on our willingness and ability and probably the necessity 
to modify -- simplify -- our life style. 
Possible policies were listed by various speakers: monetary policies; fiscal 
policies; increased production, cited over and over again as a way out of this dilemma. 
We may have some unused capacity but I seriously question whether itls going to be the 
way out now, due to less abundant, more costly basic resources. 
Increased production and reduced consumption are two sides of the same coin. We 
can take positive steps. We can offer incentives to conserve, to invest in more pro-
duction, to innovate. Some people propose wage-and-price control, such as John Kenneth 
Galbraith and AFL-CIO. Another route is restoration of a competitive economy, on which 
I have already comme~ted. In the academic community we hear the line (a favorite cop-
out of economists and some other scientists) that more research is needed. In some 
respects this is true, especially on alternative 'energy sources, improved efficiency in 
production and conservation. Also, better and expanded educational services are needed to 
help people understand the nature and causes of the situation they face in the years 
ahead, and the consequences of private and public policies. 
Irrespective of our wishes we must learn to live with less abundance, because of 
resource depletion, environmental restraints, and our economic interdependence with other 
countries. We face difficult choices in these last years of the twentieth century. The 
choices are: more investment, or more consumption; more energy or more conservation, 
or both; more public services, or more private goods; more military hardware or more 
education, health, personal safety, and nutrition. I nevertheless close on a hopeful 
note, including faith in the educational process. To use a cliche, thatls why Stahl 
and Bohi and Breimyer and Peterson were asked to contribute to the seminar, and also why 
every person attending gave two days of time to address a public issue. Ilm going to 
keep trying, and I hope everyone else will too. 
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